

FRONTIER WARFARE.

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BY

“FRONTIER”

A SERIES OF TEN LECTURES.

THACKER & COMPANY, LIMITED,
BOMBAY.

AUTHOR'S NOTE.

With a view to emphasising particular words and drawing special attention to them the author has purposely used a great number of capitals.

It is to be hoped that their free use will be of assistance to the student and lecturer.

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(1)

GENERAL PRINCIPLES.

General Principles of Mountain Warfare.

MOUNTAIN Warfare is usually the opposition of a Civilized Enemy against an uncivilized one. It is included therefore in "Small Wars" a term that has come largely into use of late years, and is somewhat difficult to define, but practically may be said to include all Campaigns other than those where the opposing sides consist of Regular Troops.

It comprises Expeditions against Savages and Semi-civilised Races by disciplined Soldiers. It comprises Campaigns undertaken to suppress Rebellions and Guerilla Warfare in all parts of the World, where organised Armies are struggling against Opponents, who will not meet them in the open Field; and it thus covers Operations very varying in their scope, and in their conditions.

The expression "Small Wars" has no particular connection with the scale on which any Campaign may be carried out. It is simply used to denote Operations of Regular Armies against Irregular, or comparatively speaking Irregular Forces.

For instance the struggle in 1894-5 between Japan and China from a Military point of view may be described as a "Small War", although large Forces were placed in the Field by both sides, for the Operations on Land were conducted between a highly trained, armed, organised, and disciplined Army on the one side, and by Forces on the other side, which, though numerically formidable, could not possibly be described as Regular Troops in the proper sense of the word.

The term "Small Wars" includes the Partisan Warfare, which usually arises when trained Soldiers are employed in the quelling of Seditions and Insurrections in Civilized Countries. It also includes Campaigns of Conquest, when a Great Power adds the Territory of Barbarous Races to its Possessions. Again the suppression of The Indian Mutiny, and the British Operations against The Egyptian Army in 1882 can be classed as "Small Wars".

The teachings of great Masters of the art of War, and the experience gained from Campaigns of modern date have established certain principles and precedents, which form the ground-work of the system of Regular Warfare of to-day. Certain rules of conduct exist, which are universally accepted. Strategy and Tactics alike are in great Campaigns governed, in most respects, by a code from which it is very dangerous to depart ; but the conditions of "Small Wars" are so diversified, the Enemy's mode of fighting is often so peculiar, and the theatres of operations present such singular features, that Irregular Warfare must be generally carried out on a method very different in many respects from the stereotyped system. The Rules of War, as generally understood, must always be modified to meet circumstances, but the conduct of "Small Wars" is in certain respects, an art by itself, diverging widely from what is adapted to the conditions of Regular Warfare, but not so widely that there are not in all its branches points, which permit comparison to be established. Therefore the art of War against an uncivilized Enemy must be looked upon as a special branch more or less. There are of course certain General Principles which must be adhered to, and the Principles laid down in the Training Manual have been found hard to argue against by Officers, who have had considerable experience of Frontier Fighting. One cannot however lay down any

hard and fast Rules for Mountain Warfare, and stereotyped Rules should be avoided as far as possible ; but one can and should work on some Principles. It is considered that the Germans follow hard and fast rules too closely, and in consequence often suffer. There is no occasion here to go much into Strategy, as that is dealt with in so many Books. Not a bad definition of Strategy is the negative one, viz—that "Tactics mean the conduct of Troops on the Battlefield, and Strategy is everything else in War."

Self-reliance, Vigilance, and Judgment are the chief requisites for overcoming the difficulties you are bound to encounter in Savage Warfare. Certainly Discipline and Organisation are powerful aids, but unless the Officers and men are well trained—capable of adapting their action to unexpected conditions, and of beating the Enemy at his own Tactics—you will probably find your Victories difficult to achieve, and needlessly costly. It is very essential therefore that if a Battalion is likely to be engaged in Mountain Warfare that the Officers certainly should go through a Course of training, and that the men should have had some training in this branch of fighting. Troops trained on the Frontier always give a good account of themselves whether fighting in the Hills or down on the Plains, and those who were on the spot agree that a few more Battalions at the Dardanelles trained in Mountain Warfare might very possibly have meant the difference between failure and success.

If all other things are equal, Troops highly trained in Mountain Warfare can manage the fighting on the Plains.

The causes of Frontier Expeditions vary, but most of them will probably come under the following Headings :—

- (1) A "Jehad" or Religious War against Infidels is preached, and the Tribes amalgamate and attack our Posts in strength. Such was the cause of The Frontier Expeditions in 1897.
- (2) A Tribe or Tribes refuse us Passage through their Country to punish another Tribe beyond. Example of this would be the Umbeyla and Chitral Expeditions.
- (3) The more turbulent members of a Tribe commit a series of Outrages within our Jurisdiction, and we fail to persuade the Tribe as a whole to control them or give any compensation. This is very probably the cause of more than half the Expeditions that have taken place.

Of these No. 1 is the most serious, as the Tribes will then bury their mutual grievances, and combine against us in very considerable strength. The different Khels or Clans may overcome their objection to fight only in their own Areas, and it is always possible therefore that we may meet them in strength at some point. Our Policy here must be to strike hard, and keep on striking until the Tribes themselves confess they have had enough. Our Forces must be relatively large. It may be necessary to move in Columns consisting of a Division, or to have mixed Brigade Columns within supporting distance. We must also here be careful as regards the Composition of our Force. The British element should be strong, and although it would be a mistake to altogether eliminate the Muhammedan element, from our Indian Troops, yet these Regiments must be carefully selected with the object of keeping it fairly low.

In the second case, we must remember that, although our action is necessary, we are forcing War on the Tribes refusing us passage, and therefore our Policy should be one of conciliation. Of course, here again, we should hit hard when necessary, but we should not destroy the Tribesmen's Property more than we can possibly avoid, and we should be willing to pay compensation. We must endeavour to show that all we want is a Passage through their Country, and that we regard their conduct in opposing us as natural. Here again, combination may be strong, but it is unlikely that Clans will go far from their own particular Areas. As however it is possible that such an Expedition may end in a "Jehad" declared; it is well to have a reserve Brigade constituted as in No. 1. And even when they have come to terms, it will be very necessary to guard the Lines of Communication through their Area with large Forces, and to maintain Moveable Columns on them to prevent advantage being taken of their length.

For instance in the Relief of Chitral—there were 15,000 men, yet there were about another 14,000 on the lines of Communication, which were something like 200 miles long.

In the third case we can generally succeed in isolating the particular Clan. Punishment should be confined to it, although some of the hot headed young men from other Clans may join in resisting us. This on the Frontier is natural and inevitable. As far as possible, we should avoid trespassing on the Areas of other Clans, and do our best to keep them neutral. Here again, we must hit hard, and keep on hitting until the Hostile Tribes confess that they have had enough. Neighbouring Tribes generally thoroughly understand how long suffering the Government has been, and they will not therefore show much sympathy for the offenders.

The more converging our Lines of advance in a case of this sort the better.

" Small Wars " may be divided into three Classes:—

- (1) Campaigns of Conquest or Annexation.
- (2) Campaigns for the suppression of Insurrection or Lawlessness.
- (3) Campaigns undertaken to avenge a wrong or to wipe out an insult.

Now with regard to No. 1.—Campaigns of Conquest are of necessity directed against Enemies on Foreign soil. It will mean external not internal War, and will generally be directed against Foemen under control of some Potentate or Chief, as few Countries are so Barbarous as not to have some form of Government or some sort of Military System. An example of this might be mentioned. Namely the Conquest of the Punjab. The Regular Troops in that Campaign enjoyed the advantage of knowing whom they were fighting with, and they had a distinct work to perform. It might be mentioned that Campaigns of Conquest and Annexation pass through two distinct Stages. In the first stage the Forces of civilization overthrow the Armies, which the Rulers and Chieftains gather in the invaded Country for its defence. A few Engagements generally suffice for this. In the second stage Organised resistance has ceased, and is replaced by the war of Ambushes and Surprises, of murdering stragglers, and of stern reprisals. The French Conquest of Algeria is a good illustration of this. In that case the French conquered the Opposing Forces, but it took years for them to establish French rule firmly in the vast Regions they had won. The same was the case in Upper Burma.

But with regard to No. 2.—Campaigns for the suppression of Insurrections or Lawlessness, stand on a

very different footing. They are necessarily internal not external Campaigns. The Regular Army here has to cope with indeterminate and not determinate Forces. The Stamping out of widespread disaffection by Military methods is a harassing form of Warfare even in a civilized Country, but in Countries peopled by Savage Tribes, such Campaigns are most difficult to bring to a satisfactory conclusion, and are most trying to the Troops.

Insurrections and Revolts in districts difficult of access, where communications are bad, and information cannot readily be obtained, involve most troublesome Military Operations. An example may be given. In The United States the periodical risings and raids of The Red Indians led to protracted indecisive Hostilities for many years. The case of The Indian Mutiny is rather different, at least in its early stages, for there the Rebels were able to put Armies in the Field, and this led to Field Operations of a most definite character, but as the supremacy of British Power became re-established in India, and as the Organised Mutineer Forces melted away, the Campaign degenerated in many Localities into merely Guerilla Warfare, which took months to bring to a conclusion.

Campaigns of the Third Class.—To avenge an insult or wrong, have characteristics somewhat similar to the conditions ordinarily governing Wars of Conquest. Hostilities to avenge a wrong will generally be on Foreign soil. Under this heading may be included Expeditions undertaken for ulterior Political purposes, or to establish order in some Foreign Land-Wars of Expediency in fact. These Campaigns differ from No. 1 chiefly in that the defeat of the Enemy need not be so complete and crushing to obtain the objects sought for.

A Force going to engage any particular Tribe must make itself thoroughly acquainted beforehand with their characteristics ; so when conflicts with any Tribe are in prospect, the strength and fighting methods of the Enemy are always most carefully considered before any decision as to the form of Operations is arrived at. The Tactics of such Opponents differ so greatly in various cases, that it is essential that these be taken carefully into consideration. In particular The Armament of the Enemy is of extreme importance. On an Expedition being ordered Intelligence Books are issued to the Force, but it is hard at such short notice for them to digest them thoroughly when there are heaps of other things to be done. A wise leader would not be absolutely dependent on his Political Officer for all knowledge of the Tribes and District. In Regular Warfare each side knows more or less what is to be expected from the Adversary, and either Adversary is to a certain extent governed by rules common to both, but in Small Wars all manner of Opponents are to be met with, for in no two Campaigns does the Enemy fight in the same fashion. Some Tribes are well armed with long Range Rifles, others perhaps a Rifle to every 10 men, and others still depend on Spears and Knives. For instance The Zulus were highly disciplined with a definite organisation of their own, yet their Weapons were those of Savages. Some of the Hill Tribes fight mounted. For instance the fighting Forces of the Arabs, Moors and Tartars have always largely consisted of Irregular Cavalry. Some Tribes—take for instance the Afridis—are well armed, and a great number have served in our Army consequently they are not so fanatical.

When we make an Advance against a Tribe on the Frontier they at once get all their Women and Children away. Directly they know that an Expedition is coming, they remove, if they can, a great quantity of

their Flocks and Herds and other Valuables across the Durand Line, where according to custom they gain an Asylum and are safe from us. A great many of our Pathan Tribes are situated between our Administrative Border and the Durand Line, which is the official Frontier between India and Afghanistan. Their Grain Reserves are generally hidden away in secret places most difficult to find. There remains their Houses, Towers, Standing Crops and Fruit Trees. When we destroy Houses and Towers, we only inflict a very temporary loss, as they can be rebuilt at little cost. The loss of a Crop destroyed or eaten up is certainly considerable but they can generally manage with their Reserves and the charity of their Neighbours to tide over the time until another Crop is grown. Fruit Trees cut down annoy them extremely—as it takes them many years to get new ones, and possibly this form of retaliation is not wise, as it tends to engender and maintain a bitterness for many years after other forms of retaliation have been forgotten.

The Afridis are possibly the best armed, and best fighters of the Frontier Tribes. They have good Houses, and own valuable Properties with the result that they have a good deal to lose, so are less likely to cause trouble.

One thing about the Afridis, they have nearly all got a Blood Feud. A great number of them in our Regiments have from time to time deserted, and some with Rifles.

These Hill Districts vary as to the ground. In the Afridis Country there is a lot of Jungle. On the other hand in the Mohmand Country it is very dry, very little water, little Jungle—so Tactics differ.

With regard to the Tactics of these Tribes they are adept at Ambushes, know every by-path, fight

well, but don't like attacking, unless they have a distinct advantage. They are like the Pariah dog in this respect. It is seldom possible to beat them at their own Tactics ; but in some Regiments, who Enlist from these Frontier Tribes, the results are often astonishingly complete.

There are usually three ways to punish a Tribe :—

- (1) Blockade, a rounding up of Men and Property, called a "Barrumpta".
- (2) Raids and Counter Raids.
- (3) Expedition.

Now Military Operations are always undertaken with some end in view, and are shaped for its achievement. If the Conquest of the Hostile Territory be aimed at, the Objective takes a different form from that which it would assume were it dispatched with merely Punitive intent. A Commander bent on extorting terms from some Savage Potentate will form his plans on different lines from the Leader sent to crush the Military Power of a menacing Tribe, but then after all the Objective depends a good deal on the class of Enemy to be dealt with. In cases of People with some settled form of Government, an Advance against their Capital will probably be opposed. Its fall will follow the defeat of the Enemy, and will at any rate bring all organised resistance to an end. In the same way dealing with Fanatical Tribes, an Advance against a Sacred Town or Shrine will have the same effect. If no such Objective is available, an Advance against his Wells or Sources of Supply may lead to contact with the Enemy. But should the Enemy refuse to make any organised resistance, then it may be necessary to resort to occupying his Country, seizing his Flocks and Supplies, burning his Villages and destroying his Crops, to obtain submission. The Tirah Campaign in 1897

affords a singular instance of a definite Objective. There it was the boast of The Afridis that the remarkable Upland Valleys, which constitute their Summer Home, and which were practically unknown to The British, had defied the efforts of all Invaders. The Objective was therefore to overcome these Valleys and make an entry into Maidan, and this was done by Sir W. Lockhart's Army, which left its mark by demolishing Buildings and Crops. As Lord Wolseley once said "If no real Objective can be found, go for what they prize most." Their Rifles and Swords are most valuable to them, but failing that their Crops should be destroyed. Each case must be decided on its merits. When fighting Hill Tribes, it should always be remembered that beating the Enemy's Army, if such Army exists, is not necessarily the main object. Moral effect is often far more important. The susceptibility of this class of Enemy to moral influences is a most important factor in the Campaign. Hesitation, delay or any retiring movement will at once be interpreted as a sign of weakness, for, while the braver of the Enemy will be encouraged, the waverers, always to be found amongst undisciplined Forces, will be tempted to throw in their lot with what appears to be the winning side. A vigorous offensive, strategical as well as tactical, is always the safest method of conducting Operations. The most complete preparations, which should include as already shown a careful study of the nature of the Country and of the mode of fighting, habits and characteristics of the Enemy, should do much to ensure the Campaign being carried through to its conclusion without a check. Success is to be achieved by discipline and vigour rather than by force of numbers.

With regard to Supplies—local resources being small—all Supplies will as a rule have to be carried on Pack Animals, as it is usually impossible on these Ex-

peditions to use wheeled Transport. Supply and Baggage Columns will therefore be both long and vulnerable. In the Tirah Campaign our Strength was about 31,000 all Ranks with some 18,000 Followers, and this Force actually had to have a Transport of about 29,000 Mules and Ponies, and about 13,000 Camels and Bullock Carts. Remember there is a limit to the number of men and animals, which it is possible to move over a Road or Tract in daylight. A small Force may have to be broken up into small and compact Columns, moving in several Lines, or on same Road at a day's interval. If the Road is bad, it is inadvisable to move more than one mixed Brigade along it on one day. The result of trying to do more, even for an 8 miles March as was done in some Expeditions is well known.

If it is essential to have a large Force say one Division at one Place on a certain day—the ways to do it are :—

- (1) To move by different Routes.
- (2) If this is impossible, to let the men and necessary animals carry their own food sufficient for 2 or 3 days, and make all Transport, not absolutely required with the fighting line, follow the next day or days.

If you attempt to force more men and animals on a Road than it can manage, the result is usually a hopeless failure, and in the end there is greater delay than if you had moved in the more rational manner with smaller Columns.

Limited Camping grounds and scarcity of water often render small Columns very necessary. Hence taken all round it is better to limit the Columns to the one Mixed Brigade.

The Areas of operation are usually not large, and two or more Columns can be concentrated therefore within a few days if required.

A Frontier Mixed Brigade generally consists of :—
1 or 2 Squads. Cavalry-Native .. $\frac{1}{2}$ to 1 B. Field Hospital.

1 or 2 Mount. Batts. (B. or N.) .. 1 to $1\frac{1}{2}$ Native Field Hospital.

1 Co. Sappers and Miners .. 1 Bde. Ammunition Column.

4 Infantry Battalions .. 1 Bde. Supply Column.

This normally comes to about 4,000 men, 2,500 Followers 1,700 Horses, Mules and Ponies and 1,200 Camels.

When you get near the Enemy, it is necessary to deliver a crushing blow, if the Action is to be decisive. You must therefore remember the freedom of an uncivilized Enemy from the complicated organization of Regular Armies, his individual independence, and his ability to disperse at will. Care should therefore be taken not to induce him to disperse prematurely at will, or to manoeuvre him out of his position, unless it be too strong to be taken without undue loss. When once beaten, he should be followed up, and given no respite until all resistance is at an end.

Country being difficult, pursuit is often hard, but to facilitate pursuit, you should have a portion of your Force thoroughly mobile and independent, the question of Supply and Transport being carefully worked out beforehand.

It must never be forgotten when dealing with a Hill Tribe that they are experts in laying Ambushes and effecting surprises. Vigilance therefore and precautions should never be relaxed.

Reconnaissances, even when everything appears to be absolutely secure, should be pushed out as far as prudence permits, and every endeavour made to preclude all possibility of surprise. So long as the Country is open, a badly armed Tribe has a small chance against trained Troops, but in Bush and very broken Country, their superior activity, recklessness and knowledge of the ground make them formidable Foes. Such ground should therefore be avoided, especially as a Halting place of Rivouac.

Now with regard to Secrecy of movements, it should not be thought that, because the Enemy is uncivilized, it is possible to relax in this respect. Many of these Savage Tribes are most cunning in the art of obtaining and utilizing information, so that the strictest vigilance must be observed, and this warning about secrecy cannot be too well instilled into Regiments engaged in Mountain Warfare. In recent Frontier Fighting it has been found on occasions very difficult to avoid leakage. It is particularly difficult for a British Regiment to spot Spies.

In Native Regiments they are more easily spotted by the men serving, who may possibly know these men coming from their own Villages in the Hills.

Any individual, who comes in to volunteer information, or bring messages from the Enemy, should be seen at some place well outside the Camp; and every care must be taken to prevent him obtaining any information whatever. The interior of the Camp should be absolutely a closed book to the Enemy.

Application of Principles.—One of the leading considerations in Mountain Warfare is to leave no higher ground within effective Range open to the Enemy from which Fire can be brought to bear.

Now this is a precaution, which must never be neglected, even when the Country is to all appearance clear and unoccupied. At the same time Commanders must use discretion about climbing higher and higher in order to obtain a better field of fire or greater command of ground, if by so doing they would make it difficult to get their men away. They should balance the difficulties, and Compromise between security and limitations of time. For instance there may be two Regiments one trained in the Hills, and the other not, The Hill trained Regiment should be used in reason for higher Picquets. And the most leading consideration may be said to be Covering Fire Cross and Frontal. The invaluable use of covering fire cannot be too strongly impressed on a Regiment, as Guns cannot be got up to most of the places where fighting takes place. Troops should practically never move without seeing they have covering fire, and in the same way all Troops should always be on the look out to give covering fire when wanted. All Troops should move on the principle of " Mutual Support ".

When moving Troops should be careful to avoid Ravines, but yet always search them. Salients, that is Spurs rather than re-entrants should be used for advances and retirements. It is not sufficient to hold the Spurs, if you have not got the Ravines clear. In 1897 a certain Regiment lost very heavily on account of moving along a Ravine instead of along a Spur—taking the Ravine as being the easiest route, and not holding the high ground

Now turning to the question of withdrawing Troops in the presence of the Enemy. This is always a most difficult operation against an enterprising Enemy. It is of the first importance that all retirements be commenced in ample time to ensure their being completed

before dark. In Retirements commanding positions must be held, so as to deny them to the Enemy. Careful Reconnaissance of ground over which the retirement is to be made, should be done, so as to avoid the risk of falling into an Ambuscade, or getting into difficult ground, the getting out of which may mean heavy loss.

When planning a retirement, ample time must be allowed for eventualities. Movement must be methodical and rapid. This sort of movement when opposed to an active and aggressive Enemy is most difficult and requires constant practice in Peace time.

Covering fire should in all cases, if possible be within about 400 to 600 yards Range, so as to be really effective.

Troops should always be on the higher ground, and out of Ravines. The great rule when fighting these Hill Tribes is to keep the Enemy below, as then they are nothing like so dangerous.

The conduct of a Retreat is justly held to be the most trying of all Operations, and especially so on the N. W. Frontier.

*Note:—*Probably better to give the above in 2 Lectures, as rather long and full of points for one.

(2)

FRONTIER WARFARE CAMPS.

Frontier Warfare Camps.

THIS is a subject for special consideration.

Owing to the large number of Animals that have to be protected, the selection of a Site in a Mountain or Jungle Country is by no means easy.

When the Officer Commanding Column has decided to Camp, a Staff Officer goes ahead with the Advanced Guard, and selects the actual Position, and there should go with him the Quarter Master or some Representative of every Unit in the Force, and the Camp Colour Men, or these latter should at any rate be not further back than in rear of the leading Battalion. On arrival at the proposed Site the Advanced Guard moves across it, and puts out temporary Picquets, or an extended line, according to the circumstances and the ground. The Staff Officer is responsible that the Site selected for the Camp is properly Picqueted as a temporary measure. For this he can use the Picqueting Troops, which were especially detailed for the March, as well as the Troops forming the Advanced Guard. These together will generally be ample for the purpose. Under protection of these Picquets the surrounding ground should be carefully examined by the Leader or an Officer or Officers detailed by him, and positions for the permanent Picquets should be fixed.

Under cover of this protection from the Advanced Guard, the Staff Officer arranges the positions of the different Corps, and points out to each Representative the exact position of his Unit ; and when the Camp has been marked out, these Representatives then meet their Units, and lead them to the spot allotted to them in the Camp, and explain all arrangements made. The

first thing to be done by the Staff Officer after selecting a Site is to decide upon the total space required by the Force, so that he can decide how much of the Perimeter will have to be given to each Unit, and to see that sufficient space is given to provide for Transport Animals and Followers of the Force, and the Units, which have to be protected, such as the Staff, Hospital, Followers, Cavalry, Guns, Stores, etc. Text Books lay down exactly how much space should be allotted to each Fighting Unit, what space should be allotted on the ground for Divisional Head-Quarters, each Battalion, a Battery, each Mule, Camel, etc., and while these spaces should be allotted as far as the ground allows, yet, as a matter of fact, it is the space required by the Baggage and defenceless Units that rule the question. It is the latter, which have to be so carefully provided for. In Savage Warfare the Infantry Battalions and all Rifles are laid along the Perimeter. Transport Animals of Units on the Perimeter should be lined in rear of their Units, or as is more usual collected in some central position. It is advisable to have a Standard Camp laid down in Standing Orders, so that everyone has a general idea of where different Units Camp, but of course it must be somewhat varied to suit the ground.

The shape of the Camp of course has to depend on the shape of the ground to a great extent, but if ground permits the shape should be as nearly as possible Rectangular, though this is seldom possible on actual Service. Many consider that Batteries and Cavalry should not be placed on the Perimeter, but if short of Infantry, some of the Cavalry may be placed there. Others again are of opinion that there is no reason why Cavalry should not be given a piece of the Perimeter to entrench and defend, though admitting it is not wise to give them too much by placing them at a Salient, or

to place them on one of the more exposed sides. They should be able to go to Water without passing through the centre of the Camp.

Again with regard to Artillery, it is said by those high in authority, and who have had considerable experience in this class of Warfare that it is well to give them a piece of the Perimeter, though not at a corner as they can entrench well, although they have not many men available as a rule to do so. If however, they are given a piece of the Perimeter to entrench, it should be enough to allow of all Guns being brought into Action, and should be where Guns are likely to be of most service at night to fire Star Shell; they should as a rule be near the Infantry, and should be able to water without going through the middle of the Camp.

Sappers and Miners should be placed on the Perimeter though not at a corner. They are generally hard at work outside the Camp until a very late hour, and should therefore not be given too much of the Perimeter to entrench.

From various measurements it has been worked out that the length of the Perimeter that has to be given to each Infantry Battalion in Frontier Warfare on the All-Mule scale of Transport averages from 250 to 300 yards in any Force of the size of a Brigade or over. This gives the approximate size of the camp on paper, namely the number of Infantry Battalions multiplied by about 300 yards. This is only a very rough guide, but it may be useful.

Now one of the first things a Staff Officer going on Service has to do is to enter in his Pocket Book a List of all the Units in his Command with the Spaces they take up in Camp, both for Ordinary and Contracted Dimensions. To use the Spaces quickly, he selects some convenient Square—say 20 yards side—

containing a superficial area of 400 Square Yards. He divides the area in yards of all his Space by 400 and enters the result as the number of Squares required by each Unit.

Now we will suppose the Force consists of the Ordinary Frontier Mixed Brigade, as to which see the first Lecture. The total Space occupied by the Units would be Ordinary 121,600 yards, and Congested 80,400 yards, which would mean the total Squares required for a Brigade would be Ordinary 304 Squares, and Congested 201 Squares. As soon as the Staff Officer has completed his Plan, he with the aid of the Colour Parties lay on the Camps, and the defensive Perimeter line when necessary. There is no necessity to demarcate the edge of Camps next the Perimeter. If a Camp is only to be occupied for one night, a deduction of Space and Perimeter should be made for the Battalion which supplies the Picquets. If on the other hand, the Camp is to be occupied for several nights full space and share of the Perimeter must be allowed, as the Picquetting duty will be changed daily.

Measures may have to be taken to send some Companies from another Battalion to Bivouac on the Site of a Battalion supplying the Picquets, and to help hold its portion of the Perimeter. Units will be shown into their Camps, as they arrive at the Camp.

A marked Salient should not be the dividing line between two Battalions, because Salients are naturally weak, and very likely to be Attacked. It will only cause divided responsibility, and that is always very inadvisable. Salients should always be blunted.

It is very undesirable to get the Perimeter too irregular, as there is the risk of Troops firing into each other at night. The Perimeter should always be demarcated if only with stores, Tents should be pitched

parallel to the Perimeter, and from 5 to 10 yards from it, in order to give men room to fall in case of Alarm. There should be a central Road through the Camp, with Branch Roads at right angles to it, at suitable intervals. The main Road should be, if ground permits, 15 feet wide—the Regulations say 10 feet but this is not enough. While the branch Roads should be 10 feet wide if possible.

Particular attention should be paid to communications within a Camp, in order to avoid confusion in the dark.

The Space allotted to Units will often be most irregular in shape, especially in the case of Infantry, on whom the duty of defending most of the Perimeter necessarily falls. Consequently always to follow any Sealed Pattern form of Bivouac or Camp is absolutely impossible, and Units must adapt themselves to the Space allotted as best they can, conforming at the same time to certain Rules. These are:—

- (1) The Companies told off for the General Reserve should not Camp on the Perimeter, but as near the Main Road as possible.
- (2) The Battalion Reserve should be centrally placed, and not on the Perimeter.
- (3) In each of the other Companies of a Battalion three Platoons should be as close to the Perimeter as possible.
- (4) The remaining Platoon, which is the Company Supports, should be well inside the Perimeter.
- (5) All Officers must be with their Companies—Battalion Staff with the Battalion Reserve.
- (6) No Cavalry, Artillery, or Sappers and Miners will usually be told off for General Reserve ; but, in other respects, they Camp

or Bivouac on similar principles, enough men to hold the Animals being placed near them.

- (7) As there will be Sentries, and men always ready to turn out with the Quarter Guard, they should be placed near the Perimeter. In selecting a Site for Camp, it should be borne in mind what perhaps may rightly be reckoned as the 3 chief Essentials, namely Water, Space and Defensibility. But these are not always to be obtained, and the best must be done in the circumstances. In practice Native information or some Map usually affords before hand a rough guide as to where the night halt will be.

Now with regard to the three chief Essentials.—Water, Space and Defensibility.

Water.—The Troops must have water, and still more the Transport Animals, who have probably been loaded up all day in the burning Sun and Dust. In practice the Animals cannot often be allowed to drink at any water that may be met with on the Road, as recommended by the Field Service Manual. In a narrow Hill or Jungle this would delay the whole Column too greatly. Then nearer the better, but if the Water for the Animals is as far as $\frac{1}{2}$ a mile away from the Camp Site, it must do ; and the Animals will have to be marched out to the water. Some sort of a Pathway will be necessary to the water, and occasionally requires a good deal of marching, and this should be one of the first works undertaken on arrival in Camp, and forms one of the reasons why Sappers and Miners should be well forward in the line of march. If the source is a Spring, then some kind of an irrigation Channel should be run off it. The Spring should be strictly protected, and a

rough Fence run round it to keep Animals out. The places for drinking, watering and washing respectively should be told off and marked, and a guard put over the drinking place to prevent Pollution. In a running Stream, the drinking place comes highest up stream, than that for watering Animals and lowest of all the washing and bathing place. Precautions should be taken to see that the Stream is not fouled above the drinking-place, although fouling is rarely done by Hill Tribes, water with them being practically sacred. If water is none too plentiful, and difficult to find, then a special Memorandum may be issued immediately on arrival in Camp, prescribing the place and the time of watering of each Unit.

Space.—Next to water it may be said that space for the Animals to stand on, and to close up comes next in importance, as it is very necessary that the Troops may be able to protect all the Animals.

Defensibility.—This will be dealt with in a subsequent Lecture. Now occasionally in Jungle or Mountainous Country, owing to want of Space, Columns may have to Bivouac along the Track in Column of Route. This is of course risky and very inconvenient, especially with long Baggage Columns. If however the Bivouac must be in this manner, then the only thing to be done is to leave Picquets on the most dangerous Heights, commanding the Road, and to keep the rest of the men in In-lying Picquet at intervals along the Track, retaining strong Forces at the head and tail, but this very dangerous way of Bivouacing is not often necessary as a Site can generally be found on Terraced Fields, or space round villages, or the stony Bed of a Ravine or River ; but you must not forget the fact that when Fighting in the Hills a really defensive Site is hardly ever to be expected. The

Lines of march lie low, near water, and are almost invariably commanded from Heights within effective Range, of long range Rifles. Defensibility in this case is attained by denying these Heights to the Enemy by a system of Picquets.

Again when laying out Camp the following points may be of Service :—

Firewood.—A supply of Firewood near the Camping ground is very essential, though not one of the vital necessities. Sometimes there is considerable difficulty about this in the Hills. When scarcity may therefore be expected, it is a good thing to follow the plan of some Hill Regiments, and order a little to be carried by all concerned.

Notice Boards.—If a stay in Camp is likely to be more than a day or two, Boards should be put up not only for watering places, but also for each Regiment and Unit. They are only a little extra to carry, and save a lot of trouble.

Flags.—Every Unit that has a Flag, such as The Staff Commissariat, Field Hospitals, etc., should invariably fly it on arrival in Camp. The Flags for Water are White for Drinking, Blue for Animals, and Red for Washing and Bathing Places.

Latrine Trenches.—These should be well outside the Perimeter for day use, and it is all the better if it can be managed to have them under the eye of the Sentries in Camp, and of course they will always be within the line of Picquets. In practice they are usually from 100 to 200 yards from the

Perimeter, according to the ground, attitude of the Enemy etc. They are marked by Flags. For night, arrangements should be made for Tins or Boxes inside the Perimeter. At dawn—until Patrols have been out Troops should not be allowed to make use of day Latrines, as they are too risky at that hour.

Cooking.—Cooking by day is done outside the line of defence, and by night inside. When fixing on positions of Kitchens, it is necessary to take into consideration, position of Latrines, Horse and Cattle Lines etc., and the quarter from which they will be likely to get most wind, so that the Kitchens may work smoothly, and the smoke be carried off in the right direction. Great and careful attention should be paid to Camp Kitchens, and to the disposal of the Kitchenslop water and refuse.

Ammunition.—Ammunition Boxes should be stored in rear of Quarter Guards, and if the Force is likely to be any length of time in Camp, an enclosure should be made to protect it in case of the Enemy rushing the Camp by night.

Sanitation.—Now the question of Sanitation in Camps is always most important, and especially so in Mountain Warfare since space is very restricted, and the same ground will probably be used by successive Forces. The importance of the prevention of Disease on Field Service cannot be overestimated. The neglect of Sanitary measures inevitably results in great loss of life ; and

disease may spread to such proportions as practically to paralyse the efficiency of a whole Force. In all Camps care must be taken to prevent fouling of ground by Excreta and Refuse. Proper arrangements must be made for dry and wet Refuse. Pack Animals litter should be burnt. Officers are responsible for their own Areas.

Passes.—No man should leave Camp unless authorised to do so.

Rifles.—Every man should be most careful for the safety of his Rifle in Camp. Some Regiments have Chains to secure their Rifles, but this is only a Regimental arrangement.

As showing the value some Tribes put on a Rifle, and what they will give to get hold of one, it may be mentioned that The Af-ridis save up their money first to buy a Rifle and secondly to buy a Wife. They have been known to carry a Coffin with apparently a dead man in, but which when opened was found to contain Rifles.

Slaughter Places.—Where British and Indian Troops Camp together it is necessary to avoid putting Slaughter Houses near Indian Troops. The Slaughter places should be screened from view. British Troops should not be allowed near Native Cooking or Watering places, nor must they touch their Cooking Utensils.

(3)

**MEASURES FOR THE SECURITY
OF A CAMP.**

Measures for the Security of a Camp.

THE question of measures for Security of a Force when halted in an Enemy's Country is perhaps one of the most difficult, as it is certainly one of the most important in Savage Warfare. In Warfare against Irregular Forces the question of security is of paramount importance. Owing to the lines on which such Foes conduct their Operations, and the fact that they are usually superior in numbers and mobility, and the Country in and around is often little known, and the broken intersected character of the ground favours the Enemy, and information can never be relied on, it follows as a matter of course that the safeguarding of the Troops from the Surprises and Ambuscades to which they are so greatly exposed is a matter to which exceptional care and attention must be devoted, and the Soldier in Camp must ever therefore be on the alert, and must constantly be prepared for the unexpected.

It was very well put by some one, who after being engaged in a "Small War" said, "Instances are constantly occurring of "the Enemy doing the very thing he is never supposed to do, and which he has never done before." Constant vigilance therefore is required from the start of the Campaign till the final breaking up of the Force, and Military precautions should never be relaxed for a moment.

The conditions demand an almost complete modification of the principles adopted in Civilized Warfare, while different descriptions of Savages and Countries again require different treatment. For instance in

Civilized Warfare, a Force in Camp relies for its Security, practically entirely on the Detached Bodies of Troops it throws out towards its Front and Flanks, that is its " Outposts ". Whereas in Savage Warfare the measures for security begin at the Camp itself, before the question of Outposts is introduced at all. Moreover security from Attack from any direction must be provided for, which is another important difference. The term " Outposts " is used in connection with Savage Warfare, but it must be understood that they are in no sense Outposts as described in Infantry Drill. They are really " Outlying self-contained Picquets ".

Patrolling by the Picquets is usually impracticable. The system adopted both by day and night is therefore that of establishing :—

- (1) An Inner line of Defence.
- (2) An Outer line of Defence.

No. 1. The Inner line is the protection of the Camp by some kind of Defensive Perimeter.

No. 2. The Outer line is the protection of the Camp by Picquets.

As to the Defensive Perimeter or Inner line of defence :—

In practically all kinds of Savage Warfare a defensive Perimeter must be made round the Camp for the protection of the Baggage, Stores, Animals etc., and to prevent the Camp being rushed, especially at night, by a sudden charge of the Enemy. The Perimeter must be built up round the whole Encampment of such material as is available, Earth, Turf, Stones etc. Stones should be covered with soil, if on top of the Perimeter, so as to avoid the danger of splinters, should bullets strike them. The Perimeter

is a protective work of Stone or Earth or both built up round the Camp according to the material and time at disposal.

The spare earth may be used to provide cover from reverse fire. The Fighting portion of a Force Encamps along the Perimeter, usually sleeping when the weather permits close under the Parapet with their Rifles beside them. Obstacles outside add very greatly to the value of the Perimeter, and it is well to put a Ditch on the outside, if it can be done, so that if it comes to hand to hand fighting men will have the advantage of higher ground. There is a great difference of opinion as to putting the Ditch outside or inside, but undoubtedly outside is the better place for it. Drainage must be provided inside the Perimeter, and it must be done well and carefully planned out before hand. When building the Perimeter, it should be worked from start to finish on a carefully thought out system, not put up anyhow.

With regard to the Disposition of Forces for Defence:

The first thing of course is the Picquets, but as they will be dealt with later, it is sufficient to say here that they will generally be detailed from one Unit and not from several. This facilitates Command, mutual support, and the formation of the March next day. Hence one Unit in Camp will generally have to receive special treatment. This is not exactly in accordance with the Training Manual, which supports the principle that Picquets should be furnished by the Units to whose front they are posted, but points for and against rather favour Picquets being detailed from one Unit.

A General Reserve will always have to be found, which should consist of say one Company from each of the Battalions not doing Picquet duty. These Companies for administrative purposes Camp within their own Battalions, but as near as possible to the Main Road. On the Alarm sounding, they fall in as quickly as possible with fixed Bayonets, and double to their place of Assembly as laid down, which will generally be the centre of the Camp on the Main Road, where the Field Officer of the-day will have them under his Command, and where he will be under the Command of the General Officer Commanding. Officers Commanding Units must detail their own Reserves, which should be distinct Companies. These do not Camp on the Perimeter. And each Company should have say a Platoon in Support not on the Perimeter.

There should be an Inlying Picquet detailed from each Company or Battalion always fully Equipped ready to fall in at a moments notice, to hold the Perimeter until the remainder of the Troops can get under Arms. They should sleep on the Perimeter.

A special place should be allotted to Camp Followers. It is laid down that the Political Followers should have a separate Camp. This may be possible or may be impossible, but even Political Followers have a right to full protection. And possibly the best solution is to make a kind of Hornwork to the Camp, to be protected by Troops.

All Jirgas (that is parties of Tribal Representatives), and Individual Tribesmen should be interviewed by the Politicals well outside the Camp.

Each Unit is responsible that Ranges are taken at once to conspicuous objects in front, and that Range Charts are made, and put up on the Parapets at intervals.

All Troops should fall in on their Alarm Posts as soon as possible after the Camp is laid out, and every evening at Sundown. Sentries are posted about every 40 yards round the Perimeter, and are always doubled at night, but this varies with the amount of light, moonlight etc.

After dark no one is to leave Camp on any excuse, unless special leave is given, and if given the Sentries should be informed.

Detached Posts should be avoided if possible, since they involve larger Garrisons, but in some cases they are indispensable.

If the Alarm is sounded, every man should know exactly where he has to go, and what is expected of him. The Field Officer of the day will point out to the Unit Commander the exact positions of the Perimeter, which his Unit has to defend. This is most necessary, as there are bits of the Perimeter such as Exits from the Camp, and places where Nullahs run up into the Camp, which unless carefully provided for, do not fall to anyone's share.

Troops should be told off to commence building the Perimeter at the earliest possible moment after arrival of Troops in Camp. It should be done as far as possible before dark, so as to have the protection through the night. It is the first night in a fresh Camp that is always the most unpleasant from a protection point of view.

As to the question of Outposts or rather Picquets in front of the Defensive Perimeter, which we call the "Outer line" of Defence.

Now the arrangements of Outposts in Small Wars varies according to the nature of the enemy, and as stated in a previous Lecture, it is absolutely impera-

tive that the characteristics of the Enemy should be as far as possible, carefully studied before engaging them. From the point of view of what Outposts are best suited to act as a Buffer against them, Irregular Warriors may practically be divided into two distinct, and very different Classes :—

- (1) Those, who in consequence of their courage and their numbers may be expected to deliver actual Attacks upon the Troops when halted.
- (2) Those, who merely seek to annoy the Force by firing into the Camp, by cutting off Stragglers, or other similar devices which their ingenuity suggests to them.

Of course some of the Warriors met with in Small Wars partake of the characteristics of both. Take for instance the Tribesmen with whom Sir B. Blood had to deal in 1897, in the Malakand Campaign. There the Hillsmen did not hesitate to attempt bold night Attacks upon fortified Camps, although they were constantly on the prowl in the darkness by night, Sniping, stalking Sentries and worrying Followers. It therefore stands to reason that the service of security must be conducted on different lines according as the Enemy belongs to one or the other of these two Classes. It would be futile to try to keep Foes like the Dervishes or Zulus at a distance by a weekly ring of Picquets, which merely mask the Camp Fire in case of Attack. On the other hand Pathans who were well supplied with modern Rifles, must not be allowed to approach close enough to the Camp to fire into it with any effect. In the Boer War again, and this comes under head of "Small Wars," it was impossible to have Picquets close in.

Speaking generally, against Irregular Warriors Picquets are always placed, so as to deny them any ground from which they can fire into Camp.

If the Enemy is armed with long range Rifles, it may be wise to Picquet heights up to a distance of 2,000 yards. It is necessary to throw out sufficient Picquets to protect the Camp, which means denying the Enemy the high ground within Rifle Range, yet one must be careful not to weaken the strength of the Fighting Force in Camp to too great an extent. It is well therefore when selecting a Site for a Camp to choose ground if possible, the formation of which lends itself to the defilade of the interior, such as a hollow between undulations, the crests of which are suitable for the Perimeter, or a commanding bluff along which the Perimeter can run.

The chief use of Outlying Picquets is to prevent the Camp being fired into. Against an Enemy therefore, who relies on cold steel rather than the Rifle, there is not much reason, at all events at night, for any outlying Picquets at all. Except that if there are any places, where such an Enemy may collect for a Rush, they should be denied to him. The Force must be ready to defend itself, on warning of an impending Attack being given by Sentries on the Perimeter. By day, one would always post a certain number of Picquets outside the Perimeter in Entrenched positions, whatever the Enemy; as otherwise no one would be able to stir outside the Perimeter or take out Animals to water etc. By night no one is allowed outside the Camp under any pretence, so the necessity for outlying Picquets at night depends on the Armament and Tactics of the Enemy.

Tribes therefore, who trust to hand to hand fighting more than to Fire Arms, such as Ghazis, Dervishes,

Zulus, Sudanese etc , the measures for security by day and night would be by day. The defensive Perimeter with Picquets 400 to 500 yards all round, and by night the defensive Perimeter alone.

Against Irregular Warriors armed with long Range Rifles, and who prefer to trust to them rather than risk their lives in a hand to hand conflict, a very extended system of outlying Picquets both by day and night must be adopted, as we have learnt by experience from Engagements with certain Tribes on the Frontier.

There may still be a few Tribes against whom a less extensive system may with safety be used, but even Savages march with the times, and it is striking how soon these Tribes learn to appreciate the power of long Range Rifles and accurate weapons, and acquire them in one way or another.

And it must now practically be taken as an established rule that it is the better course to trust more to strongly entrenched Picquets, and leave them out with instructions on no account to Retire, but to hold on to their position at all cost. If this is done, it will be found that Picquets will but rarely suffer heavy losses, and the protection of the Camp will be fairly well ensured.

(4)

PICQUETS PROTECTING A CAMP.

Picquets Protecting a Camp.

AFTER the measures for security of a Camp comes consideration of the Outer Line of Defence, which are the Picquets.

Camping grounds in Hill Warfare are nearly always commanded by the surrounding Hills, but this cannot be avoided ; so it is necessary to overcome the disadvantage by Picquetting them. If the Hills are close, they may be a positive advantage, as they defilade the Camp from distant Sniping.

In Hill Warfare the security of the Troops during the dark hours of the night is especially a source of anxiety, owing to the Sniping in which Mountaineers so generally indulge. Even when ground is fairly open, the stealth and activity of Irregular Warriors makes them individually very formidable in the dark, when they get to close quarters.

The temporary Picquets of the Advance Guard, who have probably been under Arms since before day-break, are relieved, as soon as possible, by fresh men from Camp, who have had a rest and a Meal, and who take out their Coats, Blankets and Food. Mules generally go with each Picquet, if they can get to the position, to carry their Water, Blankets, Food and Ammunition. All Picquets are self contained.

These fresh Parties picquet the heights round the Camp. They will not necessarily occupy the positions of the relieved Picquets, as very probably after more closely inspecting the ground around the Camp fresh positions in some cases will be considered more advantageous. The detailing of these Picquets and

selection of the fresh Picquet Positions is done by the Field Officer of the day, under the Orders of the General Officer Commanding.

Picquets will vary in distance from the Camp perhaps from 400 to 2,000 yards. It entirely depends on the Summits, Spurs and Eminencies that overlook and command the Camp. It is not necessary to occupy every Spur and Peak. The highest ones within immediate Range, and those most clearly defined, and with the best command of fire and view are all that are necessary.

If ground is very intersected and cut up by Ravines, then more Picquets are required, but Picquets must if possible be so posted as to assist their Neighbours with their fire.

Sentries are posted inside the Perimeter of the Picquet, and not outside at night.

Outlying Sentries should not be posted, but if ground has to be watched, which cannot be seen from the Picquet a detached Picquet should be formed for the purpose.

Picquets vary in strength from a Section to say 2 Platoons and possibly larger, but rarely more than a Platoon and also vary according to their isolation, their importance and the strength of their position. They are now larger than they were as the Enemy is now in nearly all cases better armed, and has more cohesion than formerly. If the position is an important one, then the Picquet should be under the Command of an Officer.

They should be as small as is compatible really with the object with which they are posted. Picquets must take every precaution in taking up their positions, and should at once entrench themselves, even when posted for only a night or a very short time.

They should pile up stones round or make a Sangar, and do the best available according to time. They should use any obstacle available, such as branches of Trees, with leaves taken off, thorny bushes etc. They should in short do everything possible to make the ground around impregnable.

Sangars should be shoulder high, with recesses for observation (this should not be got from over the sides) and men should vary the times at which they look through. It is advisable to place some loop holes low, so as to be able to deal with any of the Enemy collecting under the Sangar, and to get the Sangar a good width at the bottom, and tapering in towards the top, otherwise there will be trouble with it before it is half way up. The same thing applies to the Perimeter around Camp—a good base must be made.

If there is any danger of being fired on from Camp, then protection from reverse fire must be provided for.

Whenever possible Picquets are put on commanding ground, as Tribesmen do not like attacking uphill. Paths leading towards a Camp are particularly dangerous, and a Picquet should therefore always be placed on some commanding ground overlooking them.

The most difficult point about Picquets is what to do with Flat ground—as Picquets then run a risk of being shot by their own men if they retire on the Camp, or even if they stay where they are and run an equal risk of being overwhelmed by the Enemy, unless most strongly entrenched, which will generally be impossible. Sometimes on the Flat ground there is a Tower or a House useful for the Picquet to get into and where it will be fairly safe.

The usually accepted theory seems to be that when no safe position on the Flat is available, no Pic-

quets should be put out in that direction, but that a larger proportion of the Troops than usual should sleep on the Perimeter.

Picquets should be posted in daylight, not after dark.

If attacked Picquets hold on at all cost. The Picquets on the Flank generally get attacked first. Each man in a Picquet is, as soon as possible, told off to his Alarm post. A Sentry should on arrival on the position be immediately posted to keep in touch with neighbouring Picquets, so long as light allows.

All Bayonets are fixed through the night. Arms are not piled.

The Commander should always sleep along side a Sentry, so that he may, if occasion requires, be quietly and quickly roused.

Troops in Camp should know the position of Picquets, and each Picquet should know the position of other Picquets as far as possible.

Caution and care must be used not to neglect any, even of the most minor details, when Picquetting a position at night, and to work right up to the last moment strengthening the position. The Enemy may not be so very formidable in day time in the open against highly trained Troops, but at creeping and crawling about at night, laying low for hours waiting till a Sentry they have stalked grows drowsy, they are more than a match in many cases for the most highly trained Soldiers. Sentries must therefore keep their wits about them, and their eyes and ears open. Picquets must be prepared for sudden emergencies, and must act with coolness and self-reliance. In Hill Fighting, the Enemy is ever a very cunning and wary Foe.

When Outposts are relieved in the morning, the Relief should never leave Camp till daylight.

The Officer Commanding the Rear Guard is responsible for relieving the night Outpost Picquets in the morning. He does this from the Rear Guard Troops, so allowing the night Picquets to join their own Corps. As Marches will nearly always be started very early, this should be done at daybreak.

When Reliefs take place in the evening, the Troops relieved should be allowed ample time to reach Camp before dark. In the event of a night attack on the Camp, Bonfires and Flares are very useful. Care is needed that smoke from the Bonfires is not blown towards the Camp, which may possible happen if the Wind is not taken into consideration.

When Artillery forms part of the Column, Star Shells are available for this lighting up.

Individual firing in the dark at Snipers must be strictly forbidden.

A Sniper's object is usually :—

- (1) To ascertain from return fire the position of Picquets, Sentries and the Perimeter, or
- (2) To disturb the whole Force, or
- (3) To inflict loss.

If fire is not returned, Snipers fail in the first 2 of these cases, and of the third they are never certain. Besides when getting no fire in return, they very often fear a trap, and get uneasy and make off. If however fire is returned the position of the Camp and Picquets is disclosed to the Enemy, and the Troops are deprived of rest, while the chance of doing any damage to Snipers is small, since they always take good care to get behind cover, and nothing can as a rule be seen beyond

the flash of their Rifles. There must be no firing at night by Troops, unless ordered. The Bayonet must be relied on. Rapid fire however would be ordered if the Enemy attempted to rush the Camp.

The importance of maintaining strict fire discipline in case of a night Attack by the Enemy or Night Alarm can hardly be over rated. Under no circumstances does the difference between good Troops and Troops not really highly trained become more apparent than on a night March, or when engaged in a night Attack. There were many glaring instances of this in the late Boer War.

A successful Ambush sometimes at night has a deterrent effect upon the Enemy.

Very occasionally it is well to post a small party or two at night in between the Camp and the further Picquets to lay in wait for individuals or small parties of the Enemy, who creep up to fire into Camp. Sometimes the use of these Surprise parties is very great, if only to make the Enemy feel that he is insecure in his arrangements for Sniping. With these Irregular Warriors the effect of surprise is only second to that of Victory itself. You want however only picked men, trained to the Hills, and of exceptional activity, hearing and sight for this work. These Surprise parties are not however used as a rule, but only in exceptional cases, and when the right men for the work are available.

Summary of the Picquetting System.—

The system of Outposts in Hill Warfare, by day and night, against well-armed Enemies, may be conveniently summed up as follows :—

- (1) The Camp is surrounded by a Stone Wall, Breastwork, or some kind of Defensive

Perimeter, with Sentries on it at intervals generally say 4 per Company, at night Sentries are doubled with an In-lying Picquet from each Company or Battalion always ready to turn out at once to line the Perimeter.

The Field Officer of the Day always goes round the Camp at Sunset, and sees that In-lying Picquets and Sentries are posted, and touch maintained throughout.

- (2) Alarm-posts generally on Perimeter itself, are always told off for each Unit immediately on arrival in Camp. All men should parade duly on their Alarm-posts half an hour after Sunset.
- (3) Cavalry and Guns may under certain conditions be placed on the Perimeter.
- (4) There must be no firing without Orders except by Sentries when attacked, or to give the alarm, and Orders will only be given in cases where some useful result may be expected.

If the Enemy succeed in penetrating the Perimeter at any point, there can be no Firing at all, and the Bayonet is the only permissible Weapon.

Note: - Desultory fire, as a rule, should be disregarded. It is often done merely with the object of annoying the Force and drawing their fire. To answer it is a danger to those on the Perimeter and to the Picquets as they may start firing into each other.

- (5) Outside the Perimeter there must be out-lying Picquets on Peaks, Spurs or Eminen-

ces Commanding the Camp and also in any Villages, Houses or Towers, which from their vicinity to Camp, might afford harbourage to the Enemy from which to fire or attack.

- (6) Distances of Picquets from Camp vary from 400 to as much as 2,000 yards and depend on the ground.
- (7) The number of Picquets depends also on the ground, and on the attitude and activity of the Enemy.
- (8) Picquet strength varies with circumstances. A Picquet that was most desperately attacked for several hours in The Tirah Campaign, consisted of 1 Native Officer and 40 Gurkhas.
- (9) All Picquets should be strongly Sangared, with obstacles in front when possible. Sentries at night should be inside the Sangar.
- (10) There can be no falling back, and no reinforcing at night, or Patrolling. No Supports or Reserves in the usual sense are available, the former being already embodied in the Picquets, and the In-lying Picquets and the Defensive Perimeter taking the place of the latter.
- (11) If halting and Camping more than one day, Outlying Picquets are relieved according to Orders, either in the late Morning or early Afternoon.

(5)

MARCHES.

Marches.

LIKE most other branches of Military Science "Marches" demand special attention, when dealing with Savage Enemies. All things being equal, it is far more difficult to march in Hilly Country than in the Plains. In Hill and Jungle Country therefore Marches acquire a special importance. Any defects in March discipline will have more serious consequences. Men losing their distances cannot pick it up afterwards in the Hills as on the Flat, Badly loaded pack Animals for instance may mean serious delay, and so on.

It hardly needs demonstration that a rugged Mountainous Country, destitute of Roads, renders the movement of Organised Bodies of Fighting men slow and laborious, quite apart from what the Enemy may do. Any intersected terrain favours the people of the Country, who are acquainted with its intricacies, at the expense of Invaders to whom it is unknown. Wheeled Transport cannot be employed in such Theatres of War, with the result that vast Trains of Pack Animals, which stretch a great length when on the March, have to take its place. All these are points, which strike one at once, but there are many others, which perhaps are not so quite so self evident.

Again Cavalry, which is such a safeguard in the Plains, is here more often than not absent, with the result that the Enemy has the rapidity of movement all on his side.

If it is impossible to utilize Cavalry, the absence of Reconnaissance means there can be little or no warning of an impending Attack, and this, and the immobility

ty compared to the Enemy's activity and knowledge of the ground lays open the Flank, Rear or Baggage to assault, and it is obvious that the whole Column, in Mountain or Jungle Warfare, ought to be more than ordinarily compact and mobile. But unfortunately the narrowness of the Track is such that usually only Pack Animals can be taken, and even they, more often than not, can only move in single file. So that however small the Force and the quantity of Baggage allowed, the Trains must stretch out to enormous lengths, to say nothing of gaps occasioned by the steepness or badness of the Road, or by blocks due to fallen Animals and displaced loads. Again the Country, as a rule, affords little or no Supplies locally, so that Food has to be carried even for the Animals as well as the Troops. It will be understood therefore at once what difficulties Troops have to encounter on the March on the Frontier. It is very difficult for anyone who has not actually seen it on service sufficiently to realize the very large proportion of Transport to Troops, or the space occupied on the Road or in Camp which it takes up. Now as the Column must be encumbered by long Trains, the first lesson to be drawn is that every effort must be made to keep the Animals closed up, and to march on as broad a Front as possible. Even when there is known to be a defile in front, which will again compel single File, closing up at every open piece of ground enables Animals in Rear to regain their distances, and to fill up gaps. The importance of this closing up cannot be over estimated, and should claim the particular attention of Officers in the Orders and plans for Marches. The time factor is a very important consideration, far more difficult to estimate it in Hill Warfare than when Marching on the Flat. A Column on the move in the Hills has been known to take 24 hours to do $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles, owing to delay with the Mules, the Column having

come across a place where the Mules could not get along—with the result Packs had to be unloaded and carried some Distance. One can never know what difficulties he is going to be up against on the March, and in consequence he must try and be prepared for all eventualities. With regard to the Loading of Mules, all loads should be tightly tied up and ride high, and care should be taken to see animals are not overloaded. Men should have plenty of practice in the loading of Mules, as the importance of proper loading in bad Country is great. For instance a box of Ammunition if properly loaded can be opened on the March if necessary, without having to take it off the Mule at all.

Attention is invariably drawn to these points in the Standing Orders issued for every Campaign. There is another defect that is accountable for many a block, and much tailing out—that is the linking of three Mules together. In steep rocky paths, where one loaded Mule cannot well pass another, there is not even the excuse that one driver to 3 Mules may lose his Mules, and, as it is usually in these Roads that the linking is productive of the greatest harm, so in such cases at least, it is as well to put in Orders that Mules are to be unlinked. Every expedient that can in any way shorten the Column and reduce intervals in the Hills, is of paramount importance. It must always be your object to get the Baggage in as early as possible, for in any case, as has been seen, it will stretch out to miles in length, and, if it is difficult to do so by day, every difficulty and danger is greatly intensified if darkness overtakes it while still on the Road. At night, it is almost impossible to protect a long string of Animals, to say nothing of the discomfort of the Troops in front being left without their Kits, Blankets, Food etc., in the Bivouac. It is imperative to think out carefully

beforehand, taking into consideration the strength of your Column and state of the Road, what length of March you have a fair prospect of accomplishing. And when that is settled a start as early as is possible, consistently with watering your Animals, withdrawing your Picquets etc., should be made.

If, when the Baggage is in front of the Main Body, the Rear Guard is overtaken by darkness, and there is still some nasty length of Road to cover, and which is opposed by the Enemy, the best thing the Officer Commanding Rear Guard can generally do is to occupy some Villages or other Positions, and stay there for the night, sending word on ahead that he is doing so. But if he does this, then arrangements must be made to bring in the Picquets, or to reinforce them to allow of their staying out for the night. With regard to discipline it is well to mention that from the first day of an Expedition the strictest discipline among Followers on the March should be insisted on, as otherwise they are likely to give trouble.

With regard to Halts. although it is important to get the March over as soon as possible, it is not wise in the Hills to force the pace. Over driving soon exhausts the weaker among the Animals--and halts are not required as a rest for the latter. It is in fact more tiring for Mules to stand loaded, than to carry on at a steady pace, and get the journey over. Troops will generally get opportunities of resting, while Animals are from time to time closing up. If then a steady pace not too fast is kept by the leading Troops, halts need not be frequent or long. If the Road is bad and steep, gaps and tailing out are certain to occur, and halts are then required in front to enable the Columns to close up, but it is not easy to lay down rules for these halts in Orders before-hand

The Officer Commanding the Column or the Advance Guard Commander under his Orders will usually be able to halt where and for such periods as may be necessary. The average pace must be slower and more irregular than on the Flat. Fast pace uphill means stringing out the Column—then again Transport cannot move fast down Hill, so it is not possible to gain time even there. A very fair March for a day will be 7 or 8 miles. **With regard to Communication** on the March, this is more easy than on the Flat as a rule, as it is usually fairly easy to Signal, and this is about the only thing which is easier. It is well to have one Observer detailed from each Company to see his Unit is in touch with the Unit immediately in rear. And the Observer should always march on the right, or clear side of Road, so as to pass Orders back, and during a halt he should remain standing and alert on the Road. **As to setting the Pace.**—the Officer in front doing this should keep making enquiries back as to how those in rear are getting along. This he will do through the Observers. And sometimes perhaps by using a light portable Megaphone.

With regard to the Baggage Guard.—it is important that the strength and composition of these Guards should be adequate to deal with the difficulties that may be met with. The Guards should March when possible in Small Groups, so as to avoid Surprise. The Strength of the Baggage Guards will normally be laid down in Standing Orders.

The first duty of the Baggage Guard is not the protection of the Baggage from the Enemy, which is otherwise provided for, but helping to replace loads and keeping the Animals closed up.

Referring again to The Tirah Campaign in 1897 this Campaign is often chosen to serve as an example

of Operations undertaken by a Disciplined Force against Irregular Antagonists, as it illustrates very well the peculiar difficulties to which Regular Troops are exposed, when they are conducting Operations against these N. W. Frontier Tribes. In this case Anglo-Indian Troops were up against two Hill Tribes on the N. W. Frontier named The Afridis and The Orakzais—an Enemy, which was fairly well Armed. There were mistakes made in this Campaign, and as it is from mistakes much can be learnt, the Campaign from that point of view might have been a success. And considering this Campaign from the point of view of "Marches", it clearly taught us that in Hill Warfare long Marches are generally to be deprecated, owing to the great space, which even comparatively small Bodies of Troops take up on the Road. This is because of everything having to be carried on Pack Animals, which often have to March in single file with the result that the Head of the Column sometimes reaches the New Camp before its Tail has quitted the old one. It was also shown in this Campaign that long Marches are sometimes unavoidable—such as from Water to Water a long distance apart, or it may be to reach some point well ahead, because Supplies have run out. It is interesting to note here however that about the last day of the Campaign one Column halted early in the Afternoon at a point where there was no Water, after covering about 8 miles. The resulting inconvenience to men and Animals was accepted on this occasion in preference to the risk, to the Troops at the rear of the Column—had those in advance pushed on another 3 miles or so, where the Route returned to the River again. Then again as to the duration of the March being such that the Column is able to reach Camp before dark, the Campaign on this point is particularly instructive. Practically on every single occa-

sion on which a portion of the Field Force met with anything that could be construed as a Reverse, or could be described as an untoward incident, the occurrence was attributed to Troops being caught on the move in the dark; and the history of the Operations in this Campaign may indeed be said to be almost conclusive in the evidence, which it affords, of the perils to which Troops are likely to be exposed on the North West Frontier of India, if they have the bad luck to be benighted on the March, when the Tribesmen are showing activity in their Vicinity. There is always the great temptation to push on as far as possible, in the lingering hope that it may be possible after all to reach the destination before dark, but to give way to this temptation is very likely as shown in this Campaign to lead to a disaster.

Now let us deal with this question of the Order of March, which is important, and which with a Column depends mainly upon the character of the Enemy, the amount of resistance to be expected, and the Country to be Marched through.

Infantry.—Now Picquetting has formed the subject of a separate Lecture, and there we dealt with the arrangements of the Infantry in Columns to suit Picquetting, and the necessity of keeping some Units intact. It will therefore be sufficient to add here that with a Mixed Brigade it will generally be found sufficient to place half a Battalion in the Rear Guard, but if the Rear Guard is pretty certain to be pressed heavily, then to place a whole Battalion with it.

Artillery.—The position of the Artillery is a matter of very considerable difficulty. During an Advance into the Enemy's Country, if the Rear Guard is Attacked, which may happen, it may want some Guns with it. At the same time the Artillery may be wanted in front, if opposition is strong there.

No rule can be laid down, but the state of affairs existing before the commencement of each March must be weighed carefully. Speaking generally, for the first March or two, the Guns had better be all in front. After that one Section, if you have one Battery; or one Battery, if you have two Batteries, might be placed with the Rear Guard.

The Artillery in front should, as a rule be near the Head of the Main Body with say half Battalion Infantry in front of it. The Advanced Guard is so near the Main Body that there is not much use in having it there, especially as a premature use of Artillery is often most objectionable in Mountain Warfare.

When, however, Columns move out from Camp, for Foraging, blowing up Towers, etc., to return in the evening again, it is advisable when going out, to have some Artillery with the Advance Guard, as the purpose then is not so much to fight, as to gain a specific Object as quickly as possible. Though of course this does not mean that the Column does not always fight when it gets the opportunity.

When Retiring from such a Raid, or finally from an Enemy's Country, terms not having been made, the Rear Guard may expect a very hard time of it, so it must then be relatively strong especially in Artillery. And the bulk of the Artillery or possibly the whole, if there is only one Battery, should under those circumstances be with the Rear Guard. The remainder, if any, of the Artillery should be at the Tail of the Main Body.

Cavalry.—In the Advance, if the Valley is at all an open one, Cavalry can be extensively used for Reconnoitring ahead and for Picquetting, so that the bulk of them should be well forward with the Advance Guard. They can always be quickly sent to the as-

sistance of the Rear Guard, if necessary. If however the Valley is narrow and the Road bad, the Cavalry should be kept further back with the Main Body, and be sent on ahead whenever the Valley widens out again..

In a Retirement down a broad Valley, when harassing of the Rear Guard is nearly certain, Cavalry will be very useful with it, and will add to the pace at which it can move, but as some are required with the Advance Guard to Reconnoitre to the Front and Flank and do Picquetting, it is well then to put half with the Advance Guard, and half with Rear Guard. In a narrow Valley with a bad Road the bulk of the Cavalry might well be placed with the Main Body, as they would under such circumstances be rather an encumbrance to the Advance or Rear Guard. If the Valley widens in places then half can quickly reach the Advanced Guard, and half wait for the Rear Guard.

Sappers.—Unless it is certain that the Road is quite good, and Brigades where necessary exist, the Sappers should always be with the Advanced Guard in Advance or Retirement. They should be in front of everything except the Van Guard and attached Picquetting Troops. And should Sappers be left behind to blow up Towers, they should be pushed on again ahead as soon as possible.

If there is any fear of the Rear Guard being caught by darkness, and having to stay out all night, the Sappers can with advantage be left on the Road to join the Rear Guard, and help with protective works, which will probably be much required.

Pioneers.—Pioneers should be the foremost Battalion—not for part of the Advanced Guard or Picquetting but so that they may be handy for Road making where necessary.

Delaying Roadmaking and Bridging.—One more important point about Marches to remember is that when a bad piece of Road, especially a zigzag, is being made by Sappers or Pioneers, or a Bridge is under construction, crowds of Men and Animals should not be sent on to it before it is finished. The work cannot go on ; and the Column even if it can dribble across in a sort of way takes longer, than it would if it had waited till the work was completed.

Examples.—Black Mountain Bridge, Panjkora Bridge, Malakand Zigzag.

In conclusion a Body of Troops moving in an Enemy's Country is liable to be attacked at any time and from any direction, and must therefore always take measures for the protection of its Front, Flanks and Rear ; this brings us to the question of protection on the March, which will be dealt with in the next Lecture.

(6)

PROTECTION ON THE MARCH

Protection on the March.

Now the Service of Security, when on the March, necessarily differs considerably in "Small Wars" from what is customary for purposes of protection in great Campaigns. In Regular Warfare, it is practically only necessary to push out a Detachment in one direction—namely that where the Enemy is known to be—this Detachment being the Advanced Guard— but in Irregular Warfare, a Force has generally to be prepared for Attack from any side, and it must act accordingly. Going back to the time of Bonaparte's Army of experienced Campaigners, we read that in their March from Aboukir to Alexandria they were at first completely nonplussed by the Tactics of The Bedouins and Mamelukes hanging about their Flanks, till they learnt that Flanking Parties were indispensable in Such Operations. Irregular Warriors and Guerillas are far more inclined to operate against the Flanks and Rear than the Front of Troops on the March, therefore the Rear Guard and Flanking Parties assume special importance, and the ordinary rules laid down for the March of an Army are hardly applicable. Irregular Warriors in the heat of action, have a great tendency to avoid decisive collision with the front of Regular Troops, preferring to work against their Flank and Rear. It is a favourite and effective plan if they desire to harass and delay a Column of Regular Troops on the March—while retraining from engaging the Advanced Guard, to watch for a favourable opportunity to attack the Advancing Force in Flank and Rear, and unless precautions are taken much confusion may ensue, even when the Foe does not push his attack home. A Column on the March is again, very badly situated to withstand a

Flank Attack—its Train in Small Wars, being always large relatively to the Force. The Route is generally indifferent, and straggling is most difficult to avoid. And owing to the great rapidity and suddenness with which Irregular Warriors deliver their Assaults, it is most necessary that the Force on the March should be kept well closed up. A long Straggling Column is an invitation to the Enemy to attempt a Surprise. When fighting in the Hills the Column is usually very long and vulnerable, and it is almost impossible to avoid its being so. It is it may be said "All Flank." Again Ravines and Nullahs afford cover to the Enemy to rush it at any point. Moreover it is almost invariably commanded all along, from heights within convenient Range. Flank Guards, therefore, even if they could move along the heights, would have to be as long as the Column itself to be of any use. There is however a very important weakness of the Hill Enemy that can be turned to account, and that is, that he does not care to attack up Hill. He does not like you to get above him. He dislikes to attack even a small Picquet posted on a Hill, or at any rate if he does, experience has shown that he will not succeed in doing it any material damage. Again if two Peaks are Picquetted, he does not like going through between them to attack a Column on the March. Therefore by taking advantage of this, and by Picquetting the heights bordering the Track within dangerous Range, it is possible with a minimum of Troops to secure at least comparative security for the March, and safety for defenceless Transport. Now with regard to Protection on the March, the general principles are the same as those dealing with Picquet positions when at rest, but application of those principles will be modified to suit different conditions. The chief one being daylight instead of night, and the consequent possibility of

cooperation with other Picquets instead of the absolute self-dependence as necessary at night. These Picquets remain in position on the heights, while the entire Column is defiling past them, and finally join the Rear Guard. Its further action may then vary :—

- (1) The Officer Commanding the Rear Guard may then detain it to strengthen the Rear Guard or.
- (2) If the Officer Commanding the Rear Guard does not want it, it should be temporarily detained till a Troop or Company is collected, and then sent on ahead to join up again with the Unit they belong to, and which are supplying the Picquets. When Marching out of Camp Rear Guard Troops go out early to take up Picquet Positions occupied by night Picquets to enable the latter to come in. The Training Manual lays down "That Picquets are normally furnished by the Advanced Guard but when the nature of the Country necessitates a large number of Picquets, it may be found preferable to detail Special Troops, other than those of the Advanced Guard, for Picquet duties".

There are therefore two methods of Supplying the Picquets :—

- (1) One may attach a Special body of Troops to the Advance Guard for the purpose, consisting often of a different Unit to those composing the Advance Guard. When this Special Picquetting body is used up, it will be replaced by Troops from the Main body.
- (2) Gradually use up for Picquetting purposes the whole of the Advance Guard itself,

except Vanguard which must not be touched, replacing the men on picquetting duty by others from the Main body, till we have an entirely new Advance Guard.

In the 1st Method.—The Advance Guard remains a permanent body, and Advance Guard duties will be better carried out then with a continually changing Force. As the Picquetting Troops are extra to its necessary strength, it has no chance of becoming too weak at a critical moment. The Officer Commanding the Special Picquetting Troops does all the Picquetting work, though under the Orders of the Officer Commanding the Advance Guard. The Officer Commanding the Advance Guard is thus practically free to look after his proper Advance Guard duties, which are quite enough for one man. Those duties are in Irregular Warfare Observation and to protect the Column from Ambuscades and Surprises. On obtaining touch with Hostile Bodies, The Advanced Guard warns the Main Body and then retires upon it, should the Hostile gathering be on a large scale but the offensive spirit against all Savages must always be borne in mind and maintained. In Irregular Warfare the Advance Guard is rather a feeler than a buffer and in carrying out all his duties properly, the Advance Guard Commander should indeed have quite enough to do for any one man.

In the 2nd Method.—The Main Guard of the Advance Guard is constantly being changed, and the Advance Guard duties must suffer in consequence. The Officer Commanding Advance Guard is given more work to do than is consistent with efficiency—as he has to combine all the details of Picquetting with his other Advance Guard duties. As the Officer Commanding the Advance Guard is generally the

Officer Commanding the Battalion supplying it, a very serious difficulty as regards Command of the Advance Guard may be brought about, when the 1st Battalion is used up and another takes its place. In fact it is considered by those, who are high in authority and have had considerable experience of Hill Fighting, that the 1st Method is superior in every way—that is attaching a Special Body of Troops to the Advance Guard for the purpose—provided it is thoroughly understood that the Officer specially told off for Picquetting is under the Order of the Officer Commanding the Advance Guard, whose views, when difference of opinion exists, must be accepted even on the subject of Picquetting.

Apart from the above, unless precautions are taken, which are not laid down in "Frontier Warfare", both Methods possess the same disadvantage, though not quite in the same degree.—viz., when the March is long and Picquetting heavy, nearly the whole Force may become broken up and Units terribly scattered and disintegrated—and if precautions are not taken the whole Force may become a huge Baggage Guard incapable of immediate and strong offensive, or for that matter, defensive action against anything serious.

The General Officer Commanding must consider seriously how this is to be avoided, and how he can best maintain a disposition in readiness for all eventualities. It is evident that he must keep a Striking Force with the Main Body to do this. If he allows most of his Main Body to be used up for Picquetting, it will be terribly scattered and therefore towards the end of the March liable to be rushed by greatly superior Forces and defeated in detail, because the Units once sent out on Picquetting duty will but rarely catch up the Main Body until Camp is reached, unless the General Officer Commanding halts, closes up and waits for a

portion of them. This on a 12 miles March, with a Column 8 miles long would mean a delay of 4 hours at least. The result being that the Rear Guard will not arrive in Camp for 14 or 15 hours after the start of the Advance Guard. It is, as stated before, most important to get the Rear Guard in before dark, but if this halt is made, it will be impossible. Assuming it as a necessity that the Rear Guard must be got in before dark it is evident that the General Officer Commanding must do one of two things, viz :—either keep the Picquetting Troops within a certain limit or be prepared to sacrifice his striking power.

For example with an ordinary Mixed Brigade the General Officer Commanding has half Battalion as Advance Guard and half Battalion as Rear Guard. He therefore has 3 Battalions left. If the Tactical conditions necessitate his keeping 2 Battalions in hand with the Main Body, one Battalion must be able to Picquet the whole Route. If it cannot do so, it is evident that too long a March is being attempted, and either the Picquetting or Striking Force must suffer. If the March is an obligatory one, such as from Water to Water, the General Officer Commanding must make up his mind, which of the two evils is least likely to lead to a possible disaster. If on the other hand the March is not an obligatory one, and he can do so, he should halt and Camp when the Troops told off for Picquetting have been exhausted.

When the Enemy is active, and any very considerable body is likely to be encountered, it is very risky to undertake a March of over 8 miles, if the Column is 8 miles long. The Officer Commanding the Advance Guard and the Picquetting Officer, being responsible for efficient Picquetting, they will have a natural tendency to over Picquet regardless of the weakening of the Striking Force. Consequently the

A G. ☐ $\frac{1}{2}$ No. 1

S.P.T. ☐ $\frac{1}{2}$ No. 2

M.B. $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{☐ } \frac{1}{2} \text{ No. 1} \\ \text{☐ } \frac{1}{2} \text{ No. 2 P R.} \\ \text{☐ } \text{No. 3} \\ \text{☐ } \frac{1}{2} \text{ No. 4} \end{array} \right.$

B. $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{☐ } \\ \text{☐ } \\ \text{☐ } \\ \text{☐ } \end{array} \right.$

R G. ☐ $\frac{1}{2}$ No. 4

Plan No. 1

A.G. ☐ $\frac{1}{2}$ No. 1

S.P.T. ☐ $\frac{1}{2}$ No. 2

M B $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{☐ } \frac{1}{2} \text{ No. 2 P R} \\ \text{☐ } \text{No. 3} \\ \text{☐ } \text{No. 4} \end{array} \right.$

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R.G. ☐ $\frac{1}{2}$ No. 1

Plan No. 2.

General Officer Commanding must impress on them to carry out all the Picquetting with a certain Unit or Units, and if as the March goes on, they find that they are likely to exceed this, the General Officer Commanding must be at once informed. He may then settle to shorten his March, if this is possible, or if it is not, make his choice between the two evils of weak Picquets or a weak Striking Force.

If it is advisable to keep a Striking Force of 2 Battalions the disposition of the Brigade might be shown as in Plan I. Only Infantry are shown, so as not to complicate matters. Here when the Special Picquetting Force of half No. II Battalion is used up, its place is taken by the other half No. II Battalion from the Main Body leaving half No. I Battalion, No. III Battalion and half No. IV Battalion remaining untouched in the Main Body—while half No. I Battalion is ready to reinforce the Advance Guard consisting of the remainder of the Battalion, and half No. IV Battalion is ready to assist the Rear Guard consisting of the remainder of its own Battalion. On the other hand the General Officer Commanding might prefer to arrange his Forces as in Plan 2.

Here when the Special Picquetting Force of half No. II Battalion is used up, its place is taken by the other half of No. II Battalion from the Main Body; and No. III Battalion and No. IV Battalion would remain intact with the Main Body. The same idea is applicable should the General Officer Commanding settle to keep only one and half or one Battalion intact in the Main Body.

Now let us deal for a moment with the question of shortening the Column with a view of decreasing the number of Picquets.—It must be remembered that a Mixed Brigade will occupy on the March 6 to 10 miles. The difficulty of keeping such a Column without gaps

is very great, and the Advance Guard must proceed very slowly, if these are to be avoided. On a fairly bad Road 2 miles an hour should be about a maximum. A most useful automatic gap preventer is to put some slow moving Transport in front of the quicker moving Animals. For example put some Camels at the head of the 2nd Line Transport.

A proper system of communication along the Column to report gaps is of great importance.

Whenever there is a check in front the Troops and Transport in Rear must close up to the greatest extent possible. Even on the worst Roads, there are usually some open spaces, and during checks Troops and Transport must assemble on these in the closest formation. By this means sometimes 3 or 4 miles of Picquets can be brought into the Rear Guard, and sent up to the front again.

As to the Composition of Picquets it is a great mistake to imagine that only the foot Soldier can be employed on Picquet duty. Cavalry and Mounted Infantry are most valuable for this purpose, and in some cases better than the Infantry. It is wonderful what bad Country good Cavalry, accustomed to the Hills, can get over. Unfortunately however the number of Mounted Troops in Hill Warfare must be kept very low, owing to difficulties of Supply, and the amount of room they take up on the March.

Generally, even on the worst Road, there are places where the Valley opens out a bit, and the Mountains are not as precipitous as else where. In these there may be nasty Hills, 1,000 yards or more from the Road, from which the Column may be Sniped. In a case of that kind, there is a good chance of employing Mounted Troops. They save the Infantry great fatigue and can come in on the Rear Guard much quicker

than Infantry. Tribesmen as a rule too have a holy dread of the Cavalryman, especially when he is armed with a Lance.

With regard to Picquetting Orders.—It is considered advisable in Brigade Orders to detail the Picquetting and Red Flag Officer by name. They should for convenience be junior to the Officer Commanding the Advance Guard and Rear Guard respectively. I may mention here that a large Red Flag is usually carried by a man with the Main Guard of the Rear Guard to show Picquet Commanders when the end of the Column is passing, and when therefore they may get ready for the Signal from the Rear Guard Commander to come in.

As to the disposition of the Picquetting Troops.—It is probably better to leave this to the Officer Commanding Advance Guard as regards those Troops with the Advance Guard. Normally he would put most of them in the Main Body, only sending a few at a time to the Main Guard to replace those sent out as Picquets. He would call on the General Officer Commanding Brigade for re-enforcements when necessary from the Picquetting Reserve. This Reserve should not perhaps be at the head of the Main Body, as this would possibly complicate matters as regards the Artillery. This body might come immediately behind the Artillery.

With regard to the Selection of Positions for Picquets.—A paragraph in "Frontier Warfare" says "As the Officer Commanding the Advance Guard (or Picquetting Officer) advances the points, which must be held, suggest themselves to him with tolerable clearness" Now to put it mildly the Author here is extremely Optimistic. If you know the Country well, it may be fairly simple. Or if you have a good large

Scale Map, it may not be so difficult. Again if the Hills are nice ones, at nice intervals, with slopes all going the right way, such as are seen in most of the Books on this Subject, then the positions may suggest themselves as the Paragraph says with tolerable clearness. But unfortunately on Service against these Hill Tribes, these model conditions are not found. Nevill's Book on Campaigns in The N. W. Frontier says—that the N. W. Frontier is marked throughout its length by a well defined Natural Wall, which varies in height from 20,000 feet in the North, to 5,000 feet in the South, and he goes on to say that the general character of the Country is a tangled Mass of Mountains and Valleys like an exaggerated Switzerland. Among the Mountains are included Peaks, which Tower to a height of over 26,000 feet and the Valleys are often mere Gorges where man is obliged to struggle with raging Mountain Torrents for a right of way. Now this gives some idea of the Country under consideration. On a March you may come across great impassable Cliffs overhanging the Road. You cannot get up them, but the Enemy knows of paths, which he can use to do so. Rocky Ridge rises above Rocky Ridge, and Peak above Peak, ever luring you on to go further and further. You find Gorges on either Flank down which the Enemy can rush on your Transport, or on the Flank of the Rear Guard, and it is most difficult to know what to do with them. Again you may have an unfordable River on one side across which the Enemy can Snipe your Column. If you want to see bad Country for Picquetting, you will find it without any difficulty North of the Kabul River or up the Gorges of the Indus, and again round Quetta you can find some nasty bits of Country to Picquet successfully.

Picquetting is really a very difficult business, and nothing but practice, and a good eye for Country will

teach any one this important duty. Now we are apt to regard the tops of Hills as the only places for Picquets, but side Valleys and Ravines too are very dangerous places. Hence they must be Picquetted just as well as heights. It is however most difficult to do this without exposing the Picquets to plunging fire from above. It is necessary therefore to try to find some high ground within easy Range overlooking the Gorge or Ravine at the point of access to Flank of Column but this usually is most difficult. One must not do too much in the Picquetting line. There is a Book written by a very distinguished Officer, which says, that any Force advancing through the Hills, which does not secure itself by Picquetting every Commanding point within 3,000 yards of the Road is committing a criminal action. Well undoubtedly if a Force really attempted to do this on Service, its daily forward movements would be practically nil, and many of its Picquets would be lost and cut off. One must risk something. One should balance the difficulties and compromise between security and limitations of time and steer a course between the Scylla of insufficient Protection, and the Charybdis of over elaborate Picquetting. Whoever is in Command of a Picquet should be given latitude as regards its exact position, as ground is very deceptive, when looked at from the bottom of a deep Valley.

The Picquetting Officer should ride quite close to the Officer Commanding the Advance Guard telling him exactly what he is doing, and taking his Orders if necessary

As to the Strength of Picquets.—Paragraph 35 of "Frontier Warfare" lays it down as varying from 4 to 25, but undoubtedly any such number as 4 is wrong. It would not allow of the ordinary precautions being

taken such as posting a Bayonet File on the Road and looking for a way down and so on. Possibly such a Small Picquet as 4 may do as a detached Picquet, when the Main Picquet is out of sight of the Road, but rarely on Service would there be sent off a Picquet of less than say 15 men. It is well if possible that there should be with every Picquet at least one man, who knows Signalling. It is well that Water Bottles of men on Picquet should be full up before they start off, and that they are given plenty of Ammunition.

As to the question of the Occupation of Picquet Positions.—The position selected for a Picquet may be occupied by the Enemy or not. If occupied, it will always be necessary for the Picquetting Officer to take the Orders of the Officer Commanding the Advance Guard. A sufficient Force can then be detailed in addition to the Picquet to seize the position and establish the Picquet on it, returning to the Road, when this is done. The Officer Commanding the Advance Guard will decide whether this additional Party should be supplied by the Picquetting Troops or by the Advance Guard. If from the Advance Guard, then that body must stop until it returns. If on the other hand, it is from the Picquetting Troops, there may be no necessity for this, unless the position is a very threatening one and strongly occupied by the Enemy. It is quite possible that when the Enemy are driven off, the strength of the Picquet may require reconsideration on the spot, so it is well at first to send a fairly strong one. The Picquetting Officer gives the Picquet Commander a slip of paper known as a Picquetting Chit showing the serial number and strength of the Picquet and Left or Right of Road. He also keeps a Record in triplicate of all Picquets sent out. Every 2 or 3 miles, he should send one Copy to the Officer with the Red

Flag with the Rear Guard and one Copy to the General Officer Commanding. The Officer Commanding the Company supplying the Picquet should be present with the Picquetting Officer, and should likewise keep a record of the Groups supplied by his own Unit.

Frontier Regiments have little Books of these Forms printed, and always use them when Picquetting.

Now as to Action by the Picquet.—The Commander leaves a File with fixed Bayonets on the Road at the point where the Picquet leaves it. He hands over to his File the Picquetting Chit giving the particulars of the Picquet. There should be one copy with the Picquet also. He then leads his Picquet in proper formation to the position pointed out.

Possibly the following Points may be of use to any one Posting a Picquet, and should be borne in Mind.—

- (1) Men will at once lie down on reaching the Picquet Position, and keep a look out, while Picquet Commander looks round taking in situation.
- (2) The position should be a Commanding one with as good a field of view and fire as possible, and it may not be the exact position pointed out to you by Picquetting Officer, if another position near is found better on reaching the top of the Hill.
- (3) **Question of Groups.**—These vary very much from night Picquets. They must be posted under natural Cover, so as to watch all dead ground.
- (4) There must be intercommunication between Groups. These Groups should be 4 to 6 men

- (5) It is safer to have Groups scattered, than to have all Groups crowded in a Sangar.
- (6) Badly built Sangars are useless, but to draw Enemy's Fire.
- (7) After making the Sangar it is not necessary to occupy it. It can be improved, especially those parts facing danger points, One must avoid by day making cover to assist Enemy, should it become necessary to retire from the Position. The Sangar must be made assuming one will retire from it in daylight.
- (8) **Silence.**—Absolute silence when working is very essential. Men talking and making any noise enable the Enemy to creep up and reconnoitre.
- (9) **Search.**—All dead ground in the vicinity of the Picquet, should be at once searched and having searched even then every man should as far as possible be on the alert the whole time. Men should only rest in turns.
- (10) A Sentry should keep a look out towards the Bayonet File on the Road and the neighbouring Picquets. And if the Bayonet File is out of sight on the Road, then a Group should get in touch. A single man here is dangerous in view of possible mishap e.g., his capture by the Enemy.
- (11) **Concealment.**—Having done all the above, men should be well concealed avoiding unnecessary movement.
- (12) If a man sees any of the Enemy collecting in the vicinity, he will at once inform the nearest Officer.

Now with regard to the Line of Retirement of the Picquet.—It is quite probable that the way it went to its Station will not be the best way for it to come down to join the Rear Guard. If it is possible, it is advisable for the Picquet to join in at a forward angle to the Road, as this delays the Rear Guard less than if it takes a line to the Rear Guard at right angles to the line of March, or a slightly backward angle, and also prevents the Rear Guard from being seriously sniped from the abandoned Picquet Position. The question of the line of retirement will be one of the early things the Picquet Commander will consider, and he should, if necessary, send down Scouts to report on the line. When the line of retirement is settled, Picquet Commander should explain the same thoroughly to all Ranks. Further he should Signal his Bayonet File to move on to the place where his proposed retirement line joins the Road and stay there. All this may sound somewhat trivial, but it is neglect of such minor precautions, which leads to the cutting up of Picquets, or the Rear Guard being seriously delayed. The Picquet Commander should send a File or Scouts to look for a Road to descend, as there may be Cliffs for a long way down, but after some reconnoitring these will probably find a passable way down the Cliffs, whereas, if the better way down had not been first found, the Picquet might have got hopelessly hung up in the Cliffs in trying to descend, necessitating possibly the recapture of the Picquet Position by the Rear Guard, great delay and severe losses.

Now to consider some of the important Points affecting the Retirement of the Picquet :—

- (1) First of all the Picquet must hold on at all cost until Orders are received from Officer Commanding Rear Guard to retire.

They must be satisfied that the Order when received has come from him, as sometimes one Picquet starts to retire on a wrong Order given or passed, with the result that other Picquets take it up.

- (2) The order must be acknowledged by a Salute, and repeated by Signal. The Picquet nearest the Enemy should clear off before any other Picquet retires, so as to get the support of other Picquets by denying the Hill to the Enemy for the time. Failing to receive any Orders to Retire, the Picquet must hold on to their Position until Flag of Rear Guard Commander is at least abreast of their Post. When the Rear Guard Commander gives the Signal to Retire, it means that he is ready to receive the Picquet, but even then the Picquet should hold on as long as it considers it wise to do so to help other Picquets. The need and duty of mutual support must always be remembered.

Now as to Rules for actual withdrawal of Picquet :—

- (1) Concealment—All men must be got away, if possible, without letting the Enemy know the Position is vacated. But sometimes if the Picquet is well covered by fire of adjoining Picquets, and is about to retire, it may be Policy to make a bit of a show to draw the Enemy on to the position, and then "to let them have it".
- (2) Covering Party—First of all, about half the Picquet under an N. C. O. should take up a position about half way down the

Hill, say about 400 yards, or in such a position that they can cover the remaining half as they retire. The latter will afterwards go past and take up a position to cover the further retirement of the first half. The weaklings should go down with the first half.

- (3) When the Covering Party is in position.—The retirement should be done down Hill at top speed, to position lower down, and so on. The absolute necessity of rapidity of movement in such a Retirement cannot be over emphasised. Men must accustom themselves before hand to go their hardest without getting out of hand.
- (4) Successive Retirements. Each Party must move as fast as possible until it reaches the Rear Guard. When taking up a covering position care is needed to get far enough out to be able to Range and fire on the objective. For instance Supports come along and halt close up to the foot of a Hill; whereas if they kept 30 or 40 yards out, they would be in a position to cover their Troops far better
- (5) Salients.—Throughout a retirement to Spurs and Salients, must be followed and Nullahs and Re-entrants avoided.
- (6) Casualties.—The retirement must be stopped and Counter Attack made if necessary, as Casualties must be got away at all cost.
- (7) Reports.—On reaching Rear Guard the Picquet must report immediately to the responsible Officer with the Rear Guard

distinguished by a Red Flag, giving him the Picquet Chit. A written message must also go to the Unit from which the Picquet is detailed. This with the Unit Commander's report to the Rear Guard Commander, affords a double check.

Picquet Supports.—The Picquetting Officer may elect to leave Supports on the Road to back up any particularly exposed Group of Picquets. This is usually advisable, when the Enemy has shown himself in considerable strength in the neighbourhood.

Duties of Officer Commanding Picquet Units.—

When nearly the whole of his Command has gone out on Picquetting duty, the Officer Commanding the Company, Double Company, or Troops, remains on the Road, keeping with him two or three Orderlies, a couple of Signallers and 2 mounted men, when these are at his disposal. If possible, he should go back to a position opposite his first Picquet, working back to see that everything concerning his particular Picquets is correct. He should afterwards help in getting all his Picquets in. This may some times be impossible, as no one must be allowed to delay the whole Column by forcing his way back along a narrow and crowded Path. If some of the Picquets cannot get back the whole way at once the remainder go on as far as they can, and stop there until the whole of their Command in Rear comes up, and then act according to circumstances *viz.*, either remain with the Rear Guard, or pass on to the front again.

During the time of waiting, the Officer Commanding Picquetting Unit can perform the useful task of reporting to the General Officer Commanding any serious gaps that are occurring in the Column.

Similarly the Officer Commanding the Battalion or Squadron supplying the Picquetting Units when the whole of his Command has gone out, halts on the Road with a suitable Escort and Signallers, and does not go on until the whole of his Command is up.

Picquetting when Force goes out and comes back again.—Often when engaged in Foraging or blowing up Towers or destroying Villages etc., a Force has to go out 5 or 6 miles from Camp, and after completing their work, return to Camp. In such a case Picquets must remain in position until the Force is safe through them on its way home. Here the Picquets may have to be in position many hours, and will be out of Supporting reach of the Main Body. It is therefore very important that they should be stronger than in the case of ordinary Picquetting. It would be well in those cases to leave a Support on the Road for important Groups of such Picquets. Each Picquet must be warned to remain in position till the Rear Guard is abreast of it on its homeward journey. The Bayonet File on the Road should join its Picquet when the Force has passed through on its outward journey, coming back to the Road again when the Advance Guard comes abreast of the Picquet on its homeward journey.

No Red Flag should be shown by the Rear Guard on its outward journey, but must of course be shown on the homeward journey.

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**ATTACK, DEFENCE, STORMING
A FORT.**

Attack, Defence, Storming a Fort.

IN making an Attack on Tribesmen in position the general principles of the Regular Attack are applicable, but there are some points, which require attention.

The Enemy has no Artillery. This reminder may seem unnecessary, but it is often quite forgotten, as proved by the extraordinary extensions so often seen on Service when out of Rifle Fire of Irregular Warriors. The men may remain unextended until it is really necessary to Deploy, as Extension always means to a certain extent loss of control.

Again the Enemy must not be frightened away by premature use of Artillery. The greatest ambition as a rule in Frontier Warfare should be to get the Enemy to stand until it is possible to get on terms with him, and so to inflict a lesson that he will remember. Of course to attain such an object, one must be prepared to accept some losses. Should the primary object be not so much to defeat the Enemy as to drive him away, then of course the sooner the Artillery are used the better. For example when it is necessary to Picquet a Hill, which the Enemy is holding.

The Gunners get lots of opportunities later on, such as when the position is taken, and they are called on to Fire on the Retiring Forces. It is then they are very useful.

The Spurs leading up to the Enemy's position should be used, and the Valleys at any rate for Advanced Troops avoided.

Covering Fire is generally possible on the Hills, and should be freely used. If there is a particularly difficult Hill to climb, then the best Hill-men for the job must be used bearing in mind that different classes of Native Soldiers have different characteristics, which should be used and considered to the fullest extent.

If there is some particularly narrow Ridge to go along swept by fire from above, but with cover on the far side, the men should not be dribbled across by Files or Sections, but rushed in mass. There was a good instance of this at Dargai. This course will pay best in the end, as by doing so, less men will be lost.

When near the Crest where the Enemy is, one must have men thick in formed Bodies behind, for this is the time to expect a rush. This was well exemplified at Barari Tangi.

If the object is to inflict a lesson on the Enemy then manoeuvring him out of his Position must be avoided.

Every Strategem must be used to deceive the Enemy, and to effect the object, as often forms of Attack are much too simple and straight forward. In one of the Finest fights fought on the Frontier, a Res-saldar of a Cavalry Regiment was in Command. He pretended to be beaten and retired in some disorder thus beguiling the Enemy into the open. He then fell on them and gained a brilliant Victory.

If ever lucky enough to have an opportunity one should use Cavalry to charge no matter what the odds are. The result of such charges are extraordinary. Good examples were instanced at Swat River and Shabkadr.

Hill Tribes, like most Savages, are only really formidable, when one is running away from them. They fight well in Positions strongly fortified and with Flanks secure, but being without discipline or cohesion to meet envelopment are much influenced by pressure against their Flanks. Pathans are fearful of Artillery, and do not, as a rule, seriously resist a determined Advance, preferring the easier and less dangerous enterprise of harassing the Retirements, which they believe are an inevitable corollary to forward movements; or of Attacking isolated Detachments, whose Operations they have observed from their Hill tops. They are suspicious of Ambuscades, except when excited in Pursuit, and are not prone to accept Battle unless surprised. They shoot well as a rule, when not themselves under effective Fire, and when shooting into a Valley, where the strike of the bullet can be observed, their Fire is accurate. They skirmish well, and move very quickly over their Hills, but rarely, except when engaging a small Force, or by night, Attack in mass. On the other hand they often crowd their defensive Positions with men. Unless strategem is intended, the Offensive is the general rule in Tribal Warfare, for the Enemy construes a defensive attitude as a sign of fear, and becomes correspondingly elated. When Attacking Infantry, whilst securing their Flanks, should advance up Salients, taking care to afford one another mutual Fire assistance. Supports and local Reserves should be pushed as near to the firing Line as the shape of the ground will permit, but, at times, Reserves may be able to effectively support the Troops in front by Covering Fire from suitable positions behind, or on the Flanks of the line of Advance. Fire should be reserved until Units have closed on the Enemy, the object being to prevent the early evacuation of the

Positions, after having caused a few Casualties at long Range. It is dangerous to make a Frontal Attack too soon, if intending to have a Flank Attack, as one wants to get in well on the Flank when a Frontal Attack is driven home.

With regard to Reconnaissance prior to Attack Infantry Training deals with this, but Reconnaissance takes time, and thus enables the Enemy to collect in large numbers, with the result that sometimes the Reconnoitring Party meet with heavy loss when effecting their Retirement. There are cases where it is better to make a direct Attack straight away. It is often very difficult to spot exactly in Frontier Warfare from where the Enemy's shots are coming, and so to bring Covering Fire to bear on the Enemy. It is well then to be prepared to keep up Covering Fire on all Crests within Range, if not sure of the Enemy's Position.

The use of Entrenching Tools in Mountain Warfare is not great, and is seldom necessary, but during the Advance all important Tactical points gained, such as suitable Buildings, small Woods etc., should when required at once be put in a state of defence, so that the Enemy may not be able to recapture them, and that they may serve as supporting points to the Attack.

In Civilised Warfare Entrenching is to avoid being driven back, and so is not needed much in Mountain Warfare. On the Hills when an Attack is launched, it will be found that Communication is very difficult, and lesser Commanders have therefore more responsibility left to them, the Scheme of Attack must be clear to all before launching it. A large Reserve is unnecessary. One Author on the subject talks of 5 Companies in Front Line and 3 in Reserve, but it will probably be found better to have say 1 Company out of

4 in Reserve. With regard to the Fire fight, it may be pointed out that only by Fire superiority is the Advance to positions made possible but it does not take so long in Mountain Warfare to get superiority, consequently Battles do not last so long—in fact Battles rarely last more than a day. The assault with the Bayonet must not be premature, some breath must be kept in the men otherwise they will be blown just when one wants them to open a deadly Fire on the Retiring Enemy. It is seldom however these Hill Tribes wait for the actual assault, but at the same time one must not fall into the sometimes fatal mistake of under-estimating the pluck of the Enemy.

Defence.—A defensive attitude against Irregular Warriors is almost always to be deprecated, and only under certain circumstances is it to be recommended. The Operation of Troops in such Warfare must never be allowed to Stagnate, the Troops must be up and doing, striking their Adversaries when these attempt resistance, hunting them down when they shun combat.

An Army acting on the defensive tacitly admits a certain superiority on the part of the Enemy, and the very essence of the proper conduct of Campaigns against Irregular Warriors and undisciplined Foes is vigorous action.

Still there are cases sometimes when defensive tactics are forced upon Regular Troops, for instance if the Enemy attacks in great force and with reckless daring, it is usually best to receive the onslaught, and not to press forward to meet it. In every Campaign however, Detachments of Regular Troops will sometimes have to accept the position of letting the Enemy attack them, as when a small Force of Regular Troops is opposed to great hostile masses, no matter how ill-

armed or how deficient in moral those masses may be, circumstances may render it almost imperative to act on the Defensive. When small bodies of Troops are hemmed in the situation becomes especially full of peril from the very fact that owing to their inability to depart appreciably from an attitude of passive defence, the Enemy increases in assurance and its numbers rapidly swell and gain in courage from hour to hour till, he plucks up courage to risk an Assault in full strength when numbers may tell decisively. In such cases it is of supreme importance to maintain as active a defence as possible, to worry the Enemy incessantly, to compel him to believe that the Garrison is full of fight and that it has not lost heart under the untoward circumstances. Even if Counterattack in the shape of Sorties makes no material gain, it means a moral gain. A purely passive defence is improper in Warfare of any kind, but against Irregular Warriors is absolutely fatal. As the Duke of Wellington said "If we fail in only one third of our Enterprises, we should not complain, but make up our minds to this as a general rule".

When a Counter-attack on an important scale is contemplated, it is imperative that the whole Scheme shall have been considered in all its aspects, and that its details have been worked out thoroughly, as a failure under such circumstances means that an important factor of the Force has suffered a check, and the moral effect upon the Troops who from the facts of the case are working under depressing influences, may seriously effect their fighting efficiency in the future. With anything approaching an equality of Force to that of the Enemy, a passive defence is wholly inadmissible, it may no doubt occasionally be resorted to for a time, when it is intended to draw the hostile Forces on to Attack, but it must only be adopted pro-

visionally and as a temporary measure. On the defensive a great development of fire is essential, and unless there is a risk of fanatical rush strong Reserves are not required. In view of the tendency of Irregular Opponents to circle round the Flanks these should if possible rest on ground very favourably for defence, or else they should be well protected by Cavalry or Guns. The Force however should be so disposed as to ensure that, whenever in the course of the action it is proposed to change from the defensive to the offensive, there may be Troops on the spot to make the Counter-stroke with power and effect. With regard to the formation of your Force there are many advantages of a Line formation over Square, even when the Enemy is addicted to Shock Tactics. Again occupying a position and awaiting on Attack in it, leaves to the Enemy the choice of fighting or not fighting. Some opponents when in fighting mood may be trusted to Attack but they can never be depended on to do so with absolute certainty and if the Enemy declines Action there is some risk of no fighting coming off, which is of course in most cases a most undesirable consummation. Therefore when a position is held in these Campaigns in the hope that it will be attacked, arrangements should generally be made to quit it, and to assume the offensive in case the opponets shirk the engagement. Finally resolute initiative is the secret of success. A defensive attitude is generally unsound in principle, and it is not assumed in practice without good reason by a Leader who understands how to deal with Irregular Warriors.

Storming Forts.—A Problem with which one may any day be faced on Service on the Frontier is the Storming of a Tower, Fort or other Stronghold. This is by no means an easy task, and requires much thought and organisation.

If possible a most careful Reconnaissance of it from every side should be made. Officers with Telescopes should be employed for this purpose. The best plan which can in any way be got showing Doors, Gates and Flanking Towers and loopholes should be made if possible. The position of any Obstacles must also be noted.

As to the organisation of the Force, it will generally consist of :—

- (1) The Artillery.
- (2) The Explosive Party, and its immediate Covering Party.
- (3) The Covering Party
- (4) The Assaulting Party.
- (5) False Attacks.
- (6) The Reserve.

(1) The Artillery will be placed as near as possible to the Fort, and endeavour to breach it, or destroy the Flanking Towers. If The Artillery have common Shell they can do a good deal. At some Frontier Stations this is allowed. If only Shrapnel is available then not much can be done against strong works.

(2) The Senior R. E. Officer organises his Explosive Party for blowing in Gates or making a breach. Under the Officer Commanding Explosive Party, who should be an R. E. Officer if available (or a Pioneer Officer if not), should be placed another R. E. Officer as second in Command, as one will very possibly be killed. The men will be Sappers. A number of men picked Infantry (Volunteer Marksmen for choice) should accompany the Explosive Party, and facing outwards should Fire into every Loophole bearing on the point to be blown in, be it Gate or Wall. There should be two or three men for every Loophole. They

Fire as quickly as possible into the Loopholes, while the Charge is being prepared. If they do their work courageously, they should considerably lessen the danger to the Explosive Party. It is well to have two Officers with them.

When the Charge is lit, all should rush back or along the Wall away from the coming Explosion.

(3) The Covering Party, who should be picked Shots, lie down about 20 or 30 yards from the Fort opposite the point to be blown in, and Fire at every Loophole facing to the Front, and at anyone showing himself on the walls.

(4) The Assaulting Party gets as close as possible and lies down. The Explosion is the signal for them to rise, and rush in with Fixed Bayonets before the smoke and dust clear away.

(5) False Attack—should close in on all sides possible. These Attacks should be pushed with vigour just at such times as the Explosive Party are carrying out their work.

(6) The Reserve will act according to circumstances and should be behind the Assaulting Party. If there is any ground fairly near Commanding the Fort, as is often the case, it should be occupied by a Party of picked Shots to Fire at any of the Enemy showing themselves.

If plenty of men are used, who thoroughly know what to do, and the Assault is carried out with dash, losses should not be unduly heavy. If the men come in dribblets, and there are not enough, or if real resolution is not shown by all, the result will probably be disastrous. No half hearted Attacks are permissible.

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PURSUIITS AND RETREATS.

Pursuits and Retreats.

Pursuits—THE question of pursuits is in Small Wars to no small degree influenced by a peculiarity of Irregular Warriors, so marked in most cases as to be a distinctive characteristic. That is, that if beaten—they are not prepared for being vigorously pursued. As Lord Wolseley said "Nothing will demoralize the undisciplined Enemy more than rapidity of movement, and an unhesitating display of energy, and a constantly renewed and prolonged effort on your part. If he obtains a Victory he halts to plunder or to rejoice over his Victory, and is correspondingly dazed and panic stricken if, when you obtain a success, it operates upon you in a different fashion, and quickens your movements, and gives increased energy to the blows you follow up with".

When once Irregular Warriors are defeated, they are too apt to become panic stricken that Regular Troops following in pursuit can generally act with great boldness. On the other hand, owing to their great mobility, they are very difficult to pursue. This applies not only to Savages and semi-civilised Races, but also to Guerillas of a higher type. When beaten on the Battle-field, they withdraw with the utmost celerity, and really vanish with almost dramatic suddenness but usually after having gone some miles, they do not anticipate being followed up, and are therefore very frightened then if they do not find themselves safe.

It is therefore always well, if possible, to have at hand a Force of Cavalry, ready to be launched against the Enemy if he gives way, otherwise the extreme mobility of the Enemy enables them, for a time at any rate, to evade their Pursuers. So it is a most import-

ant point to have a few Parties of Horsemen ready to follow up, if a decisive tactical triumph is contemplated, more so in fact than is the case in Regular Warfare, and in Small Wars the lack of mounted Troops for this purpose has often been greatly felt.

For instance, in the early days of The Indian Mutiny, during General Havelock's Advance from Allahabad to Cawnpore, and afterwards from Cawnpore to Lucknow, want of Cavalry prevented, on more than one occasion, the full fruits of those successes over the Rebels being reaped. Again the case of Hicks Pasha at Marabia, when his Square so heavily defeated the Mahdists, there he had no Cavalry to follow up, with the result that the full force of that Victory was not driven home.

On the other hand, if unfortunately there is no Cavalry, it must not be supposed that because, to start with, the Infantry find themselves quite unable to catch Irregular Warriors, who have been defeated, it shall, as a matter of course, despair of coming up with them again,—as if there is no Cavalry available to keep the Enemy on the move, there is always considerable possibility that the Enemy, never dreaming that his adversary will have the energy and resolution to push on immediately after Victory will collect again after having fled panic stricken perhaps for some miles. A strenuous pursuit, even if it be slow, always has a great effect on Irregular Warriors. It is impossible, therefore, to insist too strongly on the importance of a determined and vigorous pursuit. The remarkable achievements of small British Forces in The Indian Mutiny were largely the result of the extraordinary efforts of all Ranks to make every successive Victory as complete as possible by following up the Mutineers relentlessly. And it is wonderful—the liberties that

can be taken by mere handfuls of men in these cases owing to the inevitable demoralization of Irregular Warriors after they have been beaten. But it is all important to make sure, when opposed to these wily Antagonists, that they really are beaten, and not playing some trick. It is well, therefore, to keep a careful look out for Ambushes, even when the Foe appears to be in full flight. If without Cavalry, it is often expedient to have a detached Force thrown well round the hostile Flank ready to pounce down on the Enemy when he retreats. If this is done, there is the risk, however, of the detached Force not for some reason reaching its place in time, and also there is the risk of its being cut off. But a movement of this class, if brought off successfully, is bound to add greatly to the completeness of Victory, and it may prove the only means of striking at the Enemy when in retreat. A detached Force, should be very careful to keep their presence concealed to the last possible moment. Owing to the terror, which undisciplined Troops always display if their Rear is threatened, a premature appearance may upset the whole plan of action.

It is a peculiar thing—the tendency of Irregular Warriors to disperse in all directions when defeated, and the fact that some of these Foes, when they are pursuing show extraordinary courage, does not much affect this. Fanatics, who attack with the most reckless daring are, for instance, when they see that Victory is hopeless, little better in this respect than the most cowardly of the lower Races. There is however one very inconvenient habit, that some of these Irregular Warriors have and that is that if they get a moment's respite after defeat, they conceal their Arms, and pose as harmless People of the Country, in which role they cannot will be molested by the Troops. This frequent-

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ly occurred in The Indian Mutiny, and happened also after the Battle of Kandahar. Very often the Country over which fighting is taking place is so bad as to render effective pursuit virtually impossible. Cavalry are not often able to act in the Indian Hills. In Hill Warfare and Bush Warfare this difficulty as to following up successes is in fact one of the chief obstacles in the way of a decisive Campaign. If by any chance the Enemy retreats in some semblance of order—then guns and Cavalry have a great chance, just as is the case in Regular Warfare, but these conditions are somewhat unusual.

Retreats.—The conduct of a Retreat is justly held to be the most trying of all operations in War. The handling of a Rear Guard against a pursuing Enemy is always a delicate task even in Civilized Warfare, when either Force is, more or less, on equal terms as regards movement over the ground. But in Savage Warfare against well armed, active, hill Tribesmen, it is about the hardest task that can fall to the lot of a Commander of men. One of the great difficulties when retiring is the carrying off the wounded, which has to be done against Uncivilized Foes. A Convoy of wounded with an Army retreating is a great responsibility. It is wise, if it can be managed, to send off the sick and wounded well in advance before the retirement commences, but if the Enemy be in a position to envelope the Flanks, or the people of the Country through which the withdrawal takes place are hostile, it is then not safe to detach the helpless from the immediate protection of the Army. A retreat will usually convert the Waverers in the hostile ranks into active participants in the fighting. In this class of Warfare, it is quite usual for crowds of the people of the Country to assemble at a safe distance to watch the fighting, ready to join

in the fray if their Compatriots should gain the upper hand. Should the disciplined Army gain the Victory, then the Waverers quietly disperse. This was well instanced at Charasia. There the hills all round the scene of Action were crowned with Tribesmen, who would at once have thrown themselves in the Fight had the late Lord Roberts, then Sir Frederick Roberts, failed with his small Force to drive The Afghan Troops from their strong position. Against retirements they have no fear for their belongings, and generally follow up with the greatest determination. Numerous instances might be given of an uncivilized Enemy's eagerness to take immediate advantage of their Adversary's Retreat. In the excitement of supposed Victory their Leaders lose what little control they had. When Regular Troops have been completely annihilated in their Campaigns, as occurred to Hicks Pasha's Army in the Soudan, the circumstances have generally been such that the beaten Army was placed in such a position that Retreat was impossible. The long line of Baggage filing out from early dawn will have made clear an intention to Retreat, and many hours will have been available for the Enemy to collect and follow up in force. In the Hills the retirement is effected by Parties moving from Knoll to Knoll or Ridge to Ridge, separated perhaps by deep and nasty Ravines, when some of the Parties must of necessity be cut off for a time at least from all support. Under the circumstances, the first lesson to be gathered is that in Hill Warfare a Force should never retire before an unbeaten Enemy, unless it is absolutely impossible to stay. The Memorandum of General Duchesne to his Officers at the commencement of his Campaign in Madagascar puts it very well with regard to Retreats.

It says :—

“Retreat.—In principle a Retirement is always a mistake. Against an Enemy such as this Expeditionary Force is going to encounter, real danger only commences with Retreat. A Force, which can advance no further, should halt on commanding ground as near as possible to the Enemy, should entrench itself, and should await Reinforcements. In altogether exceptional circumstances Retreat cannot be avoided.”

It is generally essential to conduct the Retreat as a whole with deliberation, and to offer as bold a front to the Enemy as possible, because any hurried movement will most probably tend to draw down greater hostile bodies on the Troops. At this period the presence of a few Guns is simply invaluable. As a matter of fact, in the last stages of The South African War, the chief role of the Guns, which generally formed part of each Column, was to keep the Enemy at a distance in case of a Retirement. So when Troops retire, a Rear Guard is always found to keep the Enemy at bay; and to fight a Rear Guard Action under the adverse circumstances arising in a Hill Country, means that only the highest discipline, leading, fire control, and sacrifice, will safely accomplish the task.

In a Retirement the whole of the Transport is sent forward first with as small an Escort as possible to guard it and Picquet the Road. The Rear Guard will, therefore, practically consist of the whole fighting portion, except this Escort. Not all of it will, of course, be in immediate contact with the Enemy, but it certainly should not go on too far, and none of the Troops should march into Camp until they are satisfied that the portion engaged is clear and quite safe.

With regard to the strength of the Rear Guard, one cannot lay down any hard and fast rule as Country and Enemy vary so. But supposing a mixed Force of 5 Battalions, Squadron Cavalry, Company of Sappers and Miners, 2 Batteries etc., in that case one Battalion might form the actual Rear Guard in contact with the Enemy, with another Battalion and nearly all the Guns in immediate support. It is most important in all Retirements to get the Rear Guard in early, as if they get overtaken by darkness, it is fairly certain to go rough on them. If any part of a Rear Guard see that they will be overtaken by darkness before they can reach the Camp, it should certainly not attempt to continue its retirement. The great rule in that case is—that the Party should remain where it is, and take up the best position available to defend itself through the night, precisely as a Picquet should do. Should the Enemy be pressing very close it may be necessary to make a Bayonet Charge to drive them off before settling down. The Main Body should be careful to keep touch with the Rear Guard, as if the latter get separated from the Main Body they stand a great chance of being cut off. The Main Body keeping in touch is rather different to civilized Warfare. Further it is not in accordance with the theory of Savage Warfare that the Rear Guard should halt, and force the Enemy to deploy. The Enemy generally pursues as a great irregular swarm without Military formation. The object is to keep the Foe at bay, and to do so more or less on the move. In this fighting, contrary to what is accepted as correct in Regular Warfare, a Rear Guard is in fact almost always entitled to count on support from the Main Body. Their duties in regard to each other, therefore, differ very naturally from what one reads ordinarily in Books on modern Tactics. In Regular Warfare, the great object being for the bulk of

the Army to be relieved from pressure of pursuit, they press on at their best pace. In the meantime the Rear Guard conforms to its movements as far as practicable, halting when necessary, and thereby compelling the Enemy to change from Column of Route to Order of Battle, a process which means delay. But if retreating before Irregular Warriors the Rear Guard cannot be left in the lurch. It must keep on the move, and the Main Body has to conform its pace to that of the Troops left behind to hold the Enemy in check. To keep the whole Force compact and well in hand is most essential, and perhaps even more so in Retreat than when Advancing. The principle on which Rear Guards should retire is different in the case of Small Wars from the principle on which this difficult manœuvre should be carried out when both sides consist of Regular Troops. In modern Tactics the accepted method is for the Rear Guard to deploy from time to time to compel the Pursuers to do likewise, and then to rapidly fall back by marching to another position. A bold stationary attitude one minute, and then a hasty withdrawal more or less intact. But when retiring before Irregular Warriors, a Rear Guard must usually be handled on quite different lines. In Small Wars the principle is that the Rear Guard is constantly on the move, one part of it always covering the withdrawal of the remainder. The idea is always to present a bold front to the Enemy with a portion of the Rear Guard. The whole of it must never be on the move at the same time. The retirement in face of the Enemy should be by alternate fractions of the Force. Each fraction of the Force alternately retires on and passes some other fraction, which has got into position, clearing the front when doing so, and taking up a position to cover the retirement of the latter fraction. The different Sec-

tions of a Battery act in the same manner. You want mutual co-operation between all Troops of a Rear Guard, and that is the great underlying principle. The Rear Guard Commander should always keep in hand a Reserve as long as possible to meet unforeseen events, and if he has to use it up, then he should form a fresh Reserve from the Picquets as they come in. The great asset for a Rear Guard Commander is coolness and decision, and in the men, steadiness and activity. The last men to give up a position must run as hard as ever they can—the ordinary Parade double is no good. If the Valley is fairly open Cavalry may prove invaluable in occasionally holding the rearmost line. The rear line must not get fixed at all, nor hang on when no Enemy is against them.

As to the great difficulty of moving the dead and wounded, it is important that Commanding and Medical Officers should do everything possible to facilitate their removal by training in this direction. Dhoolis are few and far between, men can only be carried a short distance on Blankets or other Stretchers, or on other men's backs—whereas often wounded men can ride on a Mule or Horse—not pleasant, but it means saving their lives. Hence Ambulance riding Mules, in addition to Dhoolis and Blanket Stretchers, should be with the Rear Guard in strong numbers, and should keep as near the end of the Rear Guard as possible. The Ghurkhas have a good Stretcher—a Net on a Pole.

If without Mules, then the Cavalry Horses may be used. There are other ways of carrying men by aid of Putties and so on, and all possible methods should be carefully taught. There ought to be one, and better still two, Medical men with Rear Guard to look after these things. It has been shown on many occasions in these Rear Guard Actions how a practical and ener-

getic Medical Officer can do wonders in helping things on. Should the Rear Guard find itself cut off and severely pursued, a bold Counter-attack will often retrieve the situation. The Main Body must be very careful on these occasions not to lose touch. The maintenance of touch between all parts of the Force is well put by someone who said:— A Column in Retreat should, as it were, resemble a Snake or Lizard, which feels any pressure on its tail along the whole length of its body—and the only means of getting this is to ensure that constant touch be kept from front to rear and not from rear to front. In the Tirah Campaign in 1897, which has been referred to before, General Lockhart in a Memorandum to his Officers of the Expeditionary Force gives very sound instructions to them as to Retreats. And this Campaign, which was against the two great Pathan Tribes called The Afridis and The Orakzais, is worth studying as it gives a good insight into Hill Fighting. A lot of mistakes unfortunately were made in that Campaign, but it is from such mistakes that so much has been learnt. It must be remembered, however, that that Force had not had experience then sufficient to base their knowledge on such as has been gained since. It is said in Field Service Regulations that the success of a Rear Guard depends on the skill and energy of its Commander, but those who have had considerable experience in Frontier Fighting consider that the success of a Rear Guard depends on the training of the Men and the lower Commanders. This is a very important factor in a Retirement—it is only judgment and considerable experience which enables a Commander to calculate the time required for a movement. And when selecting the time for commencing a Retirement is about the first occasion when Rear Guard Commanders will be put to

the test. And in conclusion it is pointed out that it is a very sound thing to have an Officer detailed to see that strict communication between Rear Guard and Main Body is maintained, as the most complete communication is essential to the success of the Rear Guard.

(9)

**BASE AND LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS
CONVOYS**

Base and Line of Communications Convoys.

GENERAL REMARKS.

The Base.—EVERY civilized Force operating in an Enemy's Country must have some safe starting point from which to draw its Supplies as it Advances, and to which it can send back its Sick and Wounded, and all superfluous stores at the Front.

This point is termed the Base ; and although a small Force may cut itself off for a time, and carry its Food with it, or subsist on local resources, it is seldom that this is possible for more than a few days.

The Line of Communication.— Particularly speaking therefore a Force of Regular Troops, however far it may penetrate into the Enemy's Country, must always keep touch with its Base, and a long " Line of Communication " will consequently stretch between the two.

This Line may be a River, Railway, Cart-Road, Camel-Road, or only a mere Hill Track ; or parts of each, or all. But whatever it may be, the greater portion of it will naturally lie within the Enemy's Country, and the Stores, Animals, Men and Material moving by it, will be open to his enterprises.

The capture of the Supplies on which the Force in Front is relying, may be productive of considerable inconvenience if nothing worse, while the total interruption of Communication, for any length of time, may result in the Surrender or Starvation of the whole Army.

It will therefore easily be understood that the protection of a long line of Communication is often a matter of considerable anxiety to the Chief Commander ; and special Troops have to be employed to prevent its being cut, as well as to escort and guard the Convoys moving up and down.

The employment of these Troops, therefore, in Attack and Defence, in connection with the line, gives rise to various tactical problems and questions, with the principles of which Officers must be prepared to deal.

Civilized and Savage Warfare compared.—In European Warfare, the complications caused by the line of Communication apply equally to both sides, and each labours under the same disadvantages. But a Savage Enemy has neither Base nor Line of Communication to trouble him, and he can therefore gather from any direction to Attack those of his Adversary undeterred by any fear of exposing his own.

The Line of Communication in Savage Warfare, therefore is usually more open to sudden descents of the Enemy than in a War between Civilised Nations, while, the consequences of total interruption are generally enhanced by the fact that the Country affords fewer local Supplies.

Various "Lines of Communication".—For the purposes of "Tactics", it will not be necessary to discuss here the relative merits of the different descriptions of Lines of Communications in regard to their carrying capacity. It will suffice to consider the measures for their protection.

A River.—A River is perhaps the most easily protected of all against Savages, as Gun-boats, and Launches armed with Machine-guns, etc., can be employed to prevent too close an approach to the Banks.

A Railway.—The case of a Railway will not often have to be considered, as, when such exists, it usually runs through friendly Country, or Country which is already conquered and pacified.

It might, however, occur in case of a Native rising (as in Lower Burma in 1885-87), and, if the Enemy systematically takes to destroying the Track, it is the most difficult of all to defend, as it is so easily rendered useless by a very few men. Pilot-Engines, and Short-Armoured-Trains ready to start at once to any threatened point were used in Burma ; while ample materials for repair should always be ready at all Stations.

Blockhouses would be usually constructed at Viaducts, Bridges, Tunnels, etc., where a breach would mean a long and serious delay.

It has generally been held that, if the Enemy has access to a Railway at all, it is not to be depended upon as a Line of Communication, and must be supplemented by a Road ; but, as a matter of fact, a Savage Enemy has not the explosives or implements necessary to effect serious damage in a short space of time, such as may be effected by Civilized Troops. Moreover, he does not understand how easily a Line may be disabled. He usually confines himself to felling a few trees across the Track, or taking up a Rail or two. In such cases a Pilot-Engine prevents the wreck of the Train, and the damage is rapidly repaired.

The saving in time, expense, and Animals by the use of even a light Railway, is so enormous, that some risk might well be incurred in laying such down behind the Troops in Savage Warfare, right up to where gradients, etc., absolutely forbid its further advance.

The General System of Protecting a Line of Communication, a Road.—The usual method of protecting

a Line of Communication has now to be considered. It is done by Special Troops, told off for the purpose under an Officer called "The General of Communications," who is second in Rank only to the General Officer Commanding of the whole Force. A Road is taken as the "Line", for the purposes of this explanation, as the most important and usual instance. But the principles apply to all Lines of Communication.

Posts.—Defensible Posts, or changing Stations, are established at intervals of about a days March along the Line, and Garrisoned to resist any ordinary Attack for a sufficient time. Each Post is Commanded by an Officer, and besides these, other Officers—called Section Commandants—are appointed to Superintend Sections of the Road, which may include two or three, or even more, Posts.

From the Posts are furnished the Escorts to the Convoys, one of which leaves the Station each way daily, and besides this, flying Columns are despatched from Posts, if necessary, (under the Orders of the General Officer Commanding the Line of Communication.) to act offensively and break up any organised attempts of the Enemy to interfere with the service of the Line.

Strength of Troops for Line of Communication.—The number of Troops for a Line of Communication of any given length, depends entirely on such peculiar and varying local conditions, that it is almost impossible to lay down anything in the shape of a general guide.

As the Force Advances, it conquers and pacifies the Country to a certain extent, or clears it at all events, of formed Bodies of the Enemy, who either retreat deeply into their fastness, or else, seeing their Fields and Villages fall one by one out of their hands, keep quiet through dread of further punishment.

Nevertheless, considering how vulnerable a long Line of Communication is, and how impossible it is to find out a Savage Enemy's intentions or movements, it is somewhat surprising at first sight how comparatively easily a Line of Communication is protected, and how few Troops are actually required.

But the moral influence of the Offensive has much to say for this. A Force Retiring will find that all the former peace and quiet was assumed, and the whole Country up in Arms at once on both sides of the Line. Again, in the case of anything like a disaster in Front, Tribes near the Line, that have up till then remained Neutral, will almost certainly join in; and in such cases, the Troops required for the Line of Communication alone, may equal if not exceed in numbers the total of the Expeditionary Force itself.

It is necessary to be prepared for all contingencies, and although every man taken for the Lines of Communication is lost to the Force in front, still, judging from some of the mobilisations on the N. W. Frontier of India, it will perhaps be useful to note that it is hardly safe to mobilise less than one Brigade for the Line of Communication, for every two detailed for the Field Force, if the Objective is likely to be at all far.

Tactical Problems that arise in connection with the Line of Communication.--Troops on the Line of Communication must be placed in the best way possible to meet the circumstances of the case. These Troops may be either :—

- (a) Escorting a Convoy, or
- (b) For defence of any portion of the Line, or any Post thereon, or
- (c) To March as a Flying Column to Attack. and drive off a Hostile gathering

The handling in the two latter cases will conform to the ordinary principles for Attack and Defence. The question of Convoys will now be considered.

Convoys.—Much of what has already been said in the Lecture regarding the March of the Transport of a Column will naturally apply also to the March of Convoys up and down the Line of Communication

In particular, such points as closing up, and Marching on as broad a Front as possible, must be carefully noticed.

The Measures for Protection will, however, be simpler. A Convoy Marches from one safe point to another along a Road, for the safety of which a number of Troops are already exclusively employed.

Within the dangerous Zone at any rate, it does not move by night, and a small Escort with it, is usually, all that is required.

Immediately behind the Fighting Force, however, the Road may be still unsafe, and in that case may have to be Picquetted, as explained in a previous Lecture, or the Convoy Escort strengthened. If Picquetting is required, this would be done by Line of Communication Troops, or Troops from the Force, or by both in combination. The Line of Communication Troops will be in greater Force towards this part of the Line.

The Senior Combatant Officer with the Convoy will command both the Transport and its Escort, but he will consult the Senior Transport Officer on all matters, which affect the welfare and convenience of the Transport he will avoid all interference with his technical functions and will give effect to his wishes unless, by so doing, the safety of the Convoy would be endangered

If a Convoy has to be got through a portion of Country where Attack is to be apprehended, then the chief points to be remembered are the following :—

- (1) The Convoy should be carefully inspected before starting, and itself consist of as good Animals as possible, well loaded and not overloaded.
- (2) They should be made to close well up on the March.
- (3) The Escort would have to either Picquet the Road itself (according to the Country), or March in Collected Bodies at the head, tail, and middle ; with the strongest Force in the middle. Baggage Guards would be as usual.
- (4) The Officer in Charge would bear in mind that his business was to get his Convoy through, and not to Fight Battles. He would therefore be very chary of parking or halting the Convoy, which would, probably, only result in giving the Enemy time to gather in larger numbers.
He should by all means use Offensive Tactics for a short Counter-Attack to drive the Enemy off any ground, on which they might be massing, in order to rush the Convoy, or annoy the Line of March by fire, but the Animals should not be halted for the purpose, unless absolutely necessary
- (5) Secrecy in movement being important—the Escort should be specially warned to avoid if possible attracting the Enemy's attention. If the Enemy is near, silence should be enforced in the Convoy itself :

- (6) If the attitude of the Drivers is doubtful, adequate measures must be taken to prevent their deserting in the event of an Attack.
- (7) Should the whole or part of the Convoy be in danger of falling into the Enemy's hands, it should be either destroyed or rendered unserviceable, and the Transport Animals should at least be either carried off or killed.

The actual Staging is not considered in this Lecture.

—As regards the actual working of Convoys by the Through Staging or Meeting System, you will find this referred to in the Field Service Manual, in which the whole matter is thoroughly discussed and explained.

The use of Cavalry and Mountain Infantry.—In fairly open, level Country by day, a comparatively small Force of Cavalry forms a most efficient Escort to the largest Convoy against Savages. For if they venture into Country where Cavalry can act, in order to Attack the Convoy, they are at the mercy of the Troopers. Indeed, the Hillman has such an exaggerated idea of the power of Mounted men, that he will not often venture within reach of them.

Generally speaking, the use of Cavalry on the Line of Communication is very great indeed. Besides their employment as Escorts, they can move rapidly to any threatened point between their Stations

As Patrols, they help greatly in keeping the Line clear of individual Marauders, or small Parties of the Enemy, and they are often able to pursue these very effectively, when least expected.

Mounted Infantry on the Line of Communication or as Escorts to Convoys, possess, in addition to the rapidity of movement, which is so essential in Savage Warfare, the power of engaging the Enemy with their

Fire, and of keeping the Battle at a distance from the Road or Convoy. They can also in some cases follow up where Cavalry would be checked by the nature of the ground. On the other hand, the moral effect of a Charge against Savages, in suitable ground, is very great, and this belongs to Cavalry proper. An Escort composed of the two in combination would have many advantages.

In the Tirah Campaign of 1897 it was a highly interesting point at the start, as to whether the Troops detailed for the Expedition ought to be Organized as one Single Column or whether the Force should be broken up into a Number of Columns moving on different Routes; and there were many arguments set out for and against either course, but it was eventually decided to make the Advance by a Single Line; and important factors influencing this decision were the fact that by doing so only a Single Line of Communication would have to be Guarded, and but one Track would have to be improved into a Route along which Convoys could pass each other here and there; and these were no doubt among the chief considerations which governed the Authorities at Army Head Quarters in arriving at their decision that there should be only Main Column of Invasion.

To give an idea of the responsibility attaching to guarding the Line of Communication in this Campaign, although the total of the Field Force amounted to about 31,000 of all Ranks, with some 18,000 Followers, yet the Transport of the Main Column with its Line of Communication Troops amounted to about 29,000 Mules and Ponies, and about 13,000 Camels and Bullock-Carts.

Again there was great care and consideration given at Army Head Quarters at Simla as to where

the Force should have its Base, as quite apart from any question as to the Route to be followed when the Campaign began in earnest, the problem of the Convoy—that was collecting the Supplies and Warlike Stores and Transport Animals, which would be required for so large an Army, in some locality immediately adjacent to the Border Line had to be settled, and in coming to a decision the Authorities were necessarily influenced by conditions beyond the Frontier as well as by conditions within British Territory. The Objective in this Campaign was Maidan, and really the point to put it shortly was whether it would be better to get the Base as close as possible (in our Territory) to Maidan, or make the Base at a point which was further away from Maidan, but to which the Supplies at the start could be taken far more readily and the advantages of the Route from the nearer point to Maidan outweighed the disadvantages arising from the length and comparative exposure of the Convoy over the preliminary Line of Communications, which did not exist in the other case.

(10)

ORDERS.

Orders.

THE Success of all Military Operations depends in a very great measure on good clear Orders being issued.

Officers must be trained to adapt their knowledge and learn to throw their Answers into the form of Orders when required.

Now an important principle underlying the general rules as to Orders is that every precaution should be taken to assist the recipient of an Order, Report or Message in grasping his instructions with a minimum of trouble and delay.

There are Four kinds of written Orders on Service :—

- (1) Standing Orders.
- (2) Routine Orders.
- (3) Operation Orders—Orders for Marches etc.
- (4) “Instructions” issued in the Form of short Memos. to Unit Commanders.

And you may add as No. 5—Verbal Messages.

Of the above Nos. 1, 2, and 3, are issued in Collective Forms, addressed to the whole Force, while Nos. 4 and 5 are addressed to Individuals.

Taking the different kinds now in detail :—

No. 1 Standing Orders.—The Object of Standing Orders is :—

- (1) To adapt existing Regulations to local conditions.
- (2) To Save frequent repetitions in Operation and Routine Orders.

Standing Orders should be carefully revised and kept upto date, otherwise they may lead to misunderstanding. For this reason, they should be confined to essentials, and only added to as circumstances require.

The Authority issuing Standing Orders is responsible that any alteration in them is notified to the Troops newly entering the Command. These Orders are published at the commencement of a Campaign, printed, and distributed to all concerned, to keep always at hand for reference. They should include all such matters as occur over and over again, and thus shorten and simplify Orders under Nos. 2 and 3.

These Orders usually contain much valuable information relative to Tactics.

The Field Service Pocket Book gives suggested Headings for these Orders, but these headings are only a guide, and a selection should be made from them of the particular Items, to be of importance for the Operations about to be undertaken. The briefer are Standing Orders the greater is the probability of their being properly understood and obeyed. It is the fault of some Staff Officers to spread out their Orders to an unnecessary length. When getting out these Orders, it must be assumed that Subordinate Commanders are Officers of Common sense, and well acquainted with Regulations so that the wearisome repetition of things laid down in Combined Training will be unnecessary. On the other hand if it is considered that anything particular is likely to be neglected, one is quite justified in calling special attention to it in Standing Orders. Local conditions frequently require an adaptation of Regulations.

For example—the Enemy's known methods of Fighting may demand certain precautions, or the

Scarcity of Water in the Area of Operations may call for other special measures.

In a large Force—Divisional Orders should be published before Brigade Orders, so that there may be no unnecessary repetitions. In a Force hastily organised on Active Service for some special object, it will frequently be necessary for the Commander to make certain Appointments in the Force from the Units under his Command. As for example the Provost Marshal, who is a very necessary person in Hill Warfare.

If no Medical arrangements have been made by superior Authority—he will have to arrange them for himself in Standing Orders.

Again it will probably be found advantageous to concisely define the Duties of the Field Officer of the day as they are rather vague in Regulations. For instance the hour of his relief should be laid down, and should not be at a time when anything particular is happening, such as the commencement or end of a March, but rather an hour or so before or after such events.

It is well to give in Orders what one may call a Standard Pattern of a Perimeter Camp, which will have to be varied of course according to ground but it helps Officers and others to find their way about in the dark. Mention should be made in Orders about the General allotment of Inlying Picquets and Reserves.

A good Standing Order about Camps is that no Transport will be allowed on the Camp Site until everything is ready for the Animals to go to their proper places at once. There is no Regulation laid down as to this, but it is most necessary for Sanitary reasons.

All permanent Fatigues and Duties should be clearly tabulated in this manner :—

Nature of Duty.	Number of men from.				REMARKS.
	No. 1 Battn.	No. 2 Battn.	No. 3 Battn.	No. 4 Battn.	
G.O.Cs. Guard Picquet- ting Staff Tents. &c. &c.		1 N.C.O. and 12 men.	&c.	&c.	

In some Standing Orders, these Fatigues and Duties are distributed through many paragraphs, which is a great mistake. And as Units are very liable to detail excessive Baggage Guards, it is well to lay down what shall be the maximum.

There should be paragraphs for treatment of Inhabitants and Grazing. And that the Baggage of different Units, shall be distinguished by Small Flags. With regard to Inhabitants. Sometimes Troops will have to march through a Country, with which there is no quarrel such as in The Chitral Campaign, and in

such a case care should be taken to see that the Tribe is treated with every consideration.

All Returns and Reports required should be detailed.

Further detail of Staff and any Appointment should be given.

No. 2 Routine Orders.—These are the Regular daily Orders issued in the Field, as in Cantonments, and deal with all matters not concerned with Operations, and include all such matters as Discipline, Appointments, Court-Martial, Changes or Reliefs of Troops, Pay-matters etc.

These Orders will usually be issued daily at fixed hours, the earlier the better. At these hours Commanders of Divisions, Brigades and Units will ordinarily send an Officer to the Headquarters of their immediate Superior. He will not only receive Orders, but will also be prepared to give any information regarding the Command to which he belongs, which the Superior may require. Watches should be compared on this occasion.

They correspond to and are in form precisely similar to the ordinary daily Regimental or Station Orders in time of Peace. So there should be no difficulty about these.

No. 3 Operation Orders. Orders for Marches. Fights, Positions etc.,—Operation Orders are separate from No. 2 (Routine Orders). And the same remark applies in practice to all these Orders for Marches etc. An Operation Order should contain just what the recipient requires to know and nothing more.

It is not necessary that definite rules be laid down as to the form in which Operation Orders should be

drafted. The object of an Operation Order is to bring about a Course of action in accordance with the intentions of the Commander, suited to the situation, and with full co-operation between all Arms and Units. And so long as this object is fulfilled, the form of the Order is of little importance. At the same time Operation Orders should be arranged as far as possible in a logical sequence, in order that they may be clear and readily understood. These Orders deal with all Strategic and Tactical Operations, such as Marches, Protection, Reconnaissance and Battle.

These Headings are intended as a Guide to the Subjects, and the sequence in framing the Orders; and such of them as are not applicable to any particular case will of course be omitted.

And as a form of Headings is laid down more or less officially, it shows that there is a necessity for a system of Uniformity in issuing Orders in the Field, as far as circumstances will permit.

And it is a great help to all concerned if, as far as possible, all Orders under No. 3 follow normally the same sequence. The eye then gets accustomed to look at once in the same place for the portions that concern the person to whom the Orders are given. Further by keeping to a formal sequence, one is not so likely to forget any point, when framing Orders.

No. 4 Orders written in Memo Form.—In Savage Warfare most Orders for Fights, the Occupation of a Defensive Position, Orders by the Advance Guard Commander etc., have to be given either verbally or in form of No. 4 that is short Memos. written on the spot.

Of course the convenience of Collective Form, whenever it is possible, is obvious, and this will be the

Form whenever possible, as then the Orders are distributed to Units, and all have their copy so that Everyone knows what everyone else is doing, and thus it saves work all round, but this is not always possible.

As when the Column is on the move, and the circumstances arise necessitating the issue of Orders forthwith, then practically as a Substitute for Verbal Orders the written Memo. Form must be used. And this will perhaps be made clear by an illustration. A Commander of a Brigade at his night halt, knows that he is to March to a certain place the next day, and that he will in all probability meet with resistance on the Road. He issues Collective Brigade Orders that night for the March of his Force, the Reconnoitring and Advance Guard Duties; and he may even go as far as his General intention if Attacked. *viz*:— (we will say) to defeat the Enemy wherever met with.

This is obviously all he can do that night. He cannot tell exactly where the resistance may be met, or what form it will take.

The next day, while Marching at the head of the Main Body, he receives a Report from a Reconnaissance in front that the Enemy is strongly posted on a certain Ridge.

He must then make his Dispositions, and issue his Orders for the Fight as rapidly as possible, in accordance with the circumstances that have arisen. His Staff Officer therefore writes on a Leaf of his Pocket Book to the various Unit Commanders what each is to do. This is the most convenient and rapid method of issuing the Orders.

The General Officer Commanding may be able to call up Commanding Officers of Regiments near at hand, and give the Orders verbally himself, but he

must still write to such Units as are at a distance—for instance, the Advance Guard, the Transport etc.; besides this, it is laid down as a principle that all Order shall be written in the Field, if possible.

These Memos. are not always so easy to write at first as Collective Orders, because they must be very short, and yet each must commence with a word as to what has been found out regarding the Enemy, and what the general intention is. Also certain Units must know what those next to them are doing.

Owing to the repetition necessitated by this fact, and seeing that most Units at any rate, have to be written to in any case, it might at first sight appear that it would be equally possible for the Staff Officer to issue one set of Collective Orders for the whole Force, (with its attendant advantage of everyone knowing what the other is doing), and send a Copy to each Unit. But on consideration you will say that this would not always do on Service. Units may have to act immediately on receipt of their Orders. It is not the time to wade through a whole set of "Brigade Orders" to find out what concerns them only. Moreover by Memo. Orders—the Orders to the Units, which have to act first can be sent off to them at once, and not be delayed while the General is thinking out those for other Units, such as The Reserves, Hospitals, Transport etc., the Order to which can be issued while the first Line are taking up their positions.

Concluding Remarks on Orders.—Every Order must be headed by Place, Date and time of issue.

The time that was used in some Campaigns has been Telegraph time, *viz.* 1 to 24 hours, counting from mid-night, and this has many advantages.

All Orders should be Numbered, and each Paragraph kept distinct. They should be as short as possible, consistent only with clearness. To ensure the latter, the writer should mentally put himself in the position of the recipient. This is in fact the golden rule in writing Orders.

In these days it is fully recognised that scope must be given for Individual initiative, and it is against the principles of Drill Regulations to fetter Subordinate Commanders by too detailed Orders. This point cannot be too strongly insisted upon.

The correct interpretation of Orders is second only to the power of drafting them.

Orders cannot be given for all sorts of details to a Commander, who is probably some distance away. The man on the spot is generally the best judge of how to carry out what he is required to do. Subordinate Commanders have therefore to exercise their own discretion as to what Orders are absolute, and in what respects a more or less free hand is purposely left them.

Notwithstanding the greatest care and skill in Framing Orders unexpected local circumstances will render the precise execution of the Orders given to a Subordinate unsuitable or impracticable. And if such circumstances should arise then the following principles should guide an Officer in deciding on his course of action.

- (1) A formal Order should never be departed from either in letter or spirit—(a) so long as the Officer, who issued it is present ; (b) if the Officer who issued the Order is not present, provided that there is time to report to him, and await a reply without losing an opportunity or endangering the Command.

- (2) A departure from either the spirit or the letter of an Order is justified if the Subordinate, who assumes the responsibility bases his decision on some fact which could not be known to the Officer, who issues the Order, and if he is conscientiously satisfied that he is acting as his Superior, if present, would Order him to act.
- (3) If a Subordinate, in the absence of a Superior, neglects to depart from the letter of his Orders, when such departure is clearly demanded by circumstances; and failure ensues, he will be held responsible for such failure.
- (4) Should a Subordinate find it necessary to depart from an Order, he should at once inform the Issuer of it, and the Commanders of any neighbouring Units likely to be affected.

